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I.   INTRODUCTION
The right of the people to bear arms in their own defen[s]e, and to
form and drill military organizations in defen[s]e of the State . . . is
significant as having been reserved by the people as a possible and nec-
essary resort for the protection of self-government against usurp[a]tion,
and against any attempt on the part of those who may for the time be in
possession of State authority or resources to set aside the [C]onstitution
and substitute their own rule for that of the people. Should the contin-
gency ever arise when it would be necessary for the people to make use
                                                                                                         
* Copyright 1996 by Roland Docal.
** The author wishes to express his gratitude to Lori Docal for her encouragement and
helpful insights.
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of the arms in their hands for the protection of constitutional liberty,
the proceeding, so far from being revolutionary, would be in strict ac-
cord with popular right and duty.1
The average American gun collector does not accumulate weaponry
for so lofty a purpose as to protect his constitutional form of government
or his constitutional liberties. He is not fanatical. The collector may not
keep a weapon for personal protection. He has no pathological or greed-
based desire to use his firearms for criminal purposes. His focus is on the
beauty, craftsmanship, rarity, and profit potential that accompany the pos-
session of firearms. While the collector usually sides with pro-gun forces,
he does so to ensure the continued legality of his activity and to protect
the value of his investment.
In the film Wall Street, inside-trader Gordon Gekko (portrayed by Mi-
chael Douglas) enjoyed a display of power when he attempted to impress
his arch-rival Sir Lawrence Wildman (portrayed by Terence Stamp) with
his gun collection.2 Mr. Gekko reached into a glass case, removed a
handgun, and proclaimed, “The rarest pistol in the world, Larry—the .45
Luger. Only six of them were ever manufactured.”3 Michael Zomber of
Culver City, California, owns the .45 Luger used in the movie, person-
ally valued in excess of $1,000,000.4 Although he receives many offers
for the gun, Mr. Zomber claims the Luger is not for sale.5
Harry L. Coe, IV, like Mr. Zomber, collects firearms.6 He recently
completed the restoration of a mass-produced 1954 Russian SKS semi-
automatic rifle, for which he paid only $105.7 In restored condition, the
firearm is worth a bantam $175;8 however, like Mr. Zomber, Mr. Coe
would not sell his weapon at fair market value—“It’s simply not for
sale.”9
Mr. Coe does not play in the same league as Mr. Zomber. An im-
mense gulf, indeed an ocean, lies between the monetarily appraised values
of their collections. Nonetheless, both Mr. Zomber and Mr. Coe rely
                                                                                                         
1. THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 298 (3d ed. 1898).
2. WALL STREET (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 1987).
3. Id.
4. Garry James, We Shoot the Million $$ Luger, 38 GUNS & AMMO MAGAZINE 30
(1994). Indeed, “[t]he rarity and historical importance of this pistol to collectors makes it li t-
erally priceless.” Id. at 31 (quoting CHARLES KENYON, JR., LUGERS AT RANDOM).
5. Id. at 30.
6. Interview with Harry L. Coe, IV, in Tampa, Fla. (June 15, 1995).
7. Id.
8. Id. (personally valued by Mr. Coe); Telephone Interview with Wain Roberts,
President, Wain Roberts Firearms, Inc. (May 8, 1996) (Mr. Roberts is a self-described
former pro-gun lobbyist and a licensed firearms dealer through Wain Roberts Firearms,
Inc.).
9. Id.
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upon the Second,10 Fifth,11 and Ninth12 Amendments to protect the legal-
ity of their status as gun collectors and to secure the value of their in-
vestments.
This Comment argues that the listed amendments should be legally
sufficient to guarantee Americans the right to bear arms and the right to
receive compensation for the diminution in value of those arms subjected
to use or resale restrictions pursuant to gun control legislation.13 To the
strict constructionist, the plain meaning of the enumerated amendments
favors the American gun collector. However, strict construction is not the
vogue in modern American jurisprudence.14 Consequently, this Comment
issues a “call to arms” for American gun collectors by highlighting the
serious threat posed to their legitimate endeavors through the combined
forces of popular sentiment, a vociferous anti-gun lobby, a compliant
Congress, and a complacent judiciary.
Part I reviews the historical and common law foundation for a consti-
tutionally endorsed right to bear arms. Part II discusses the congressional
“arms race”—the increasingly frequent legislative enactments aimed at
the unqualified regulation, if not the outright elimination, of firearms in
American society—and anticipates a possible course of future federal leg-
islation. Part III examines the United States Supreme Court’s silence on
the issue of gun rights and the consequent failure to enforce the Second
and Ninth Amendments. Part IV predicts continued success for gun con-
trol forces to culminate in a series of statutory measures eliminating fire-
arm transactions or confiscating guns outright. Part V reviews the Court’s
confusing and inconsistent adjudication of Fifth Amendment “takings”
cases. Part VI considers the viability of applying the Fifth Amendment to
the potential outcomes explored in part IV. Finally, part VII explains the
jurisprudential principles that the Supreme Court must apply in order to
fulfill the Court’s constitutional role as protector of the Bill of Rights. In
conclusion, this Comment challenges the Supreme Court to bypass the
                                                                                                         
10. The Second Amendment to the Constitution of the United States proclaims that “[a]
well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to
keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. CONST. amend. II.
11. The Fifth Amendment states that “private property [shall not] be taken for public use,
without just compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V.
12. The Ninth Amendment asserts that “[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.” U.S. CONST.
amend. IX.
13. This Comment, unlike the majority of articles addressing the Second Amendment,
does not directly address gun-related violence. Rather, the focus of this Comment is on fire-
arms collecting as an investment vehicle and hobby. The Comment’s primary concerns are
with basic American values—wealth preservation and the pursuit of happiness. Undoubtedly,
the focus of federal gun control legislation has been to reduce gun-related violence. While this is
an admirable goal, congressional methodologies improperly deprive law-abiding citizens, in-
cluding gun collectors, of their fundamental constitutional rights.
14. See discussion infra part VIII.
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popular sentiment contradicting gun rights and defend the Bill of Rights
through strict adherence to the express provisions of the Constitution.
II.   HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A.   In the Olde Country
The roots of the Constitution found fertile soil in English history and
common law. The Second and Ninth Amendments are not exceptions to
this rule.
William Blackstone, an eighteenth-century commentator on the devel-
opment of English jurisprudence, noted a widespread and inveterate socie-
tal distrust of standing armies.15 Blackstone attributed this popular attitude
to a fear that standing armies would firmly establish the sovereign’s
authority with a concomitant endangerment of individual liberties.16 In re-
sponse to this public perception, Alfred, King of England from 871 to
899,17 ordained that the defense of England would be the responsibility of
a people’s army.18 All English males capable of bearing arms were re-
quired to purchase and possess weapons sufficient to fulfill their obliga-
tion to defend the realm.19 During the reign of Elizabeth I, Queen of
England from 1558 to 1603, this people’s army came to be known as the
“militia.”20
Some historians believe that national armament and the accompanying
threat of physical force contributed to the moderation of government
power and promoted individual liberties.21 Unfortunately, Charles II de-
railed the growth of English individual liberties during his reign as King
of England from 1660 to 1685.22
Charles II, assisted by Parliament’s Militia Act of 1661, assumed con-
trol over the militia and discharged those members perceived as disloyal
to the throne.23 In 1662, having assembled and molded the equivalent of a
personal standing army, Charles II directed his newly constituted military
                                                                                                         
15. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 408-10 (St. George Tucker ed.) (1803)
(“In a land of liberty, it is extremely dangerous to make a distinct order of the profession of
arms.”).
16. Id.
17. 1 THE NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 259 (Robert McHenry ed., 15th ed. 1992)
[hereinafter ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA].
18. BLACKSTONE, supra note 15, at 410.
19. David E. Vandercoy, The History of the Second Amendment, 28 VAL. U. L. REV.
1007, 1010 (1994); cf. Robert A. O’Hare, Jr. & Jorge Pedreira, Note, An Uncertain Right:
The Second Amendment and the Assault Weapon Legislation Controversy, 66 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 179, 185 n.22 (1992) (indicating that the affirmative requirement to own guns was car-
ried over from England to colonial Georgia, Massachusetts, and Virginia).
20. Vandercoy, supra note 19, at 1011.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1016; 3 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 17, at 113.
23. Vandercoy, supra note 19, at 1016; BLACKSTONE, supra note 15, at 412-14.
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force to disarm all subjects considered a threat to his rule.24 The importa-
tion of guns was prohibited and gunsmiths were required to report any
firearms manufactured and sold.25 Parliament further assisted Charles’s
dictatorial scheme by enacting the Game Act of 1671, which was intended
to disarm the general population by limiting the right to possess firearms
to those persons entitled to hunt; the Game Act decreed that persons
permitted to hunt would be limited to those earning substantial annual in-
comes from the land.26
Charles II was succeeded on the throne by James II, King of England
from 1685 to 1688.27 James II continued the oppression, and sought to
establish totalitarian control over Parliament and to rule by divine right.28
Snubbing Parliamentary law, James II quartered his troops in private resi-
dences.29 James II suspended the Habeas Corpus Act and appointed judges
who would “find that the laws of England were the King’s laws and the
King could dispense with them.”30 He extended the policy of popular dis-
armament to Ireland and used his private army to enforce his laws.31
Despite efforts to maintain dominion through disarmament, James II’s
tyrannical rule was ended by force of arms in the Glorious Revolution.32
William III, Prince of Orange, ruler of Holland and son-in-law of James
II, responded to an invitation from Parliament to invade England and
claim the throne jointly with his wife, Mary.33 Upon successfully wresting
the monarchy from James II in 1689, William and Mary’s powers were
restricted by Parliament’s adoption of the Declaration of Rights.34 The
Declaration recognized the historical existence of an individual right to
bear arms.35 Furthermore, Parliament replaced the Game Act with provi-
sions that firearms be restricted only to the wealthy and be taken by the
government only if used for poaching.36 Accordingly, England established
the legal principle that the possession of firearms was a matter of individ-
ual right subject only to confiscation for illegal use.
                                                                                                         
24. Vandercoy, supra note 19, at 1016.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. 6 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 17, at 482-83.
28. Vandercoy, supra note 19, at 1016.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1017.
31. Id.
32. 6 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 17, at 482-83; 10 ENCYCLOPAEDIA
BRITANNICA, supra note 17, at 854-55.
33. Vandercoy, supra note 19, at 1017.
34. Id.
35. Id.; see also David B. Kopel, It Isn’t About Duck Hunting: The British Origins of the
Right to Arms, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1333 (1995) (reviewing JOYCE L. MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND
BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT (1994)) (noting that the “British
Bill of Rights includ[ed] an explicit right to arms.”).
36. Vandercoy, supra note 19, at 1019.
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Blackstone described the rights of individual English subjects as falling
into two distinct categories: absolute or relative.37 Absolute rights were
possessed by individuals regardless of any other consideration.38 Relative
rights were incidental to the individual’s membership in English society.39
Blackstone opined that the right to bear arms was absolute and that the
individual could wield that right for private purposes such as self-
preservation, hunting, and marksmanship or for public purposes to con-
tradict actual or threatened violence by an oppressive government.40 From
Blackstone’s perspective, the right to bear arms, whether exercised for
private or public purposes, was essential to the individual’s protection at
times when the protections afforded by law could not be timely had or
were otherwise unavailable due to despotic governmental action.41
James Harrington, a seventeenth-century English philosopher best
known for his views on ideal government, was a major contributor to the
development of “republican” thought in England.42 Harrington believed
that the people were capable of self-rule, that the English monarchy was
therefore superfluous, and that an armed populace represented a popular
government’s best defense against either foreign or domestic enemies.43
Harrington not only refuted the necessity of a standing army but also
feared that such an army could be used to impose tyranny.44
During the eighteenth century, the English political theorist Henry
Neville extended Harrington’s argument by propounding the concept that
an armed populace represented an exceptional advantage to democratic
governments.45 Neville noted that other regimes would not risk losing
control by permitting the existence of an armed populace.46 Since democracy
                                                                                                         
37. BLACKSTONE, supra note 15, at 123.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 143-44, 144 n.41; see also Kopel, supra note 35, at 1351 (noting that “[t]he
right to arms became . . . commonly regarded as sacrosanct”).
41. BLACKSTONE, supra note 15, at 140-41.
42. 5 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 17, at 718-19; see generally THE
POLITICAL WORKS OF JAMES HARRINGTON (John G.A. Pocock ed., 1977).
43. Vandercoy, supra note 19, at 1020-21 (discussing the views of James Harrington);
see also Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 647
(1989) (restating Harrington’s thesis that the “independent yeoman should also bear arms”).
44. Levinson, supra note 43, at 647.
45. Vandercoy, supra note 19, at 1021.
46. Id. Henry Neville’s theory regarding arms control in societies dominated by despotic
forms of government proved to be accurate. For example:
Four days after Hitler’s triumphant Anschluss of Austria in March 1938, the Nazis
finally enacted their own firearms laws. Additional controls were layered on the
1928 Weimar law: Persons under eighteen were forbidden to buy firearms or am-
munition; a special permit was introduced for handguns; Jews were barred from
businesses involving firearms; Nazi officials were exempted from the firearms
permit system; silencers were outlawed; twenty-two caliber cartridges with hollow
points were banned; and firearms which could fold or break down “beyond the
common limits of hunting and sporting activities” became illegal.
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is, by definition, “government of the people, by the people, [and] for the
people,”47 Neville argued that democratic government could be strength-
ened only by arming the nation’s most vital members.48
B.   Something Old, Something New
Blackstone’s views, as well as those of the English republican theo-
rists, strongly influenced contemporary American political thought.49 “It
has become almost a cliché of contemporary American historiography to
link the development of American political thought, including its consti-
tutional aspects, to republican thought in England . . . .”50 Indeed, the re-
publican philosophy adopted by the natal United States was founded on
English and classical history which included a belief that popular posses-
sion of firearms was essential to the preservation of liberty and a republi-
can form of government.51
While early Americans were polarized between the Federalists’ desire
for a strong central government and the Anti-federalist view that local
autonomy was the key to self-rule, both factions agreed that popular fire-
                                                                                                         
On November 9, 1938 and into the next morning, the Nazis unleashed a nationwide
race riot. Mobs inspired by the government attacked Jews in their homes, looted
Jewish businesses, and burned synagogues, with no interference from the police. The
riot became known as “Kristallnacht” (“night of broken glass”). On November 11,
Hitler issued a decree forbidding Jews to possess firearms, knives, or truncheons un-
der any circumstances, and to surrender them immediately.
Nazi mass murders of Jews began [less than three years later].
David B. Kopel, Symposium: Guns at Home, Guns on the Street: An International Perspective
Book Review, 15 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 355, 361-62 (1995) (reviewing JAY
SIMKIN ET AL., LETHAL LAWS (1994)).
The Nazis gave America the Volkswagen and the idea for the interstate highway
system. Did Hitler give us the Gun Control Act of 1968 as well?
And if he did? That was 25 years ago. Does it still matter? It very much matters to
Aaron Zelman . . . whose research demonstrates that the GCA of 1968 has very
much in common with the Nazi Weapons Law of 18 March, 1938.
This week marks the 50th anniversary of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising. Zelman
thinks there’s no better time to recall how the Nazis used gun control laws to disarm
Jews.
Jim Strang, Hitler’s Influence on U.S. Gun Law, THE PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 18, 1993, at C1.
47. Abraham Lincoln, Address at Gettysburg Field (Nov. 19, 1863), reprinted in 2 Carl
Sandburg, ABRAHAM LINCOLN: THE WAR YEARS 469 (1939).
48. Vandercoy, supra note 19, at 1021 (arguing “that by arming the people, democracies
could obtain incomparable advantage over neighboring aristocracies because the aristocracies
could not arm their populace for fear they would seize the government”).
49. Id. at 1020-22; see also JOYCE L. MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE
ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT (1994) (describing the evolution of the English right
to arms into the American Second Amendment); O’Hare & Pedreira, supra note 19, at 185
(noting that an American “tendency to adopt the basic precepts of English law . . . resulted in
the approval of individual gun ownership”).
50. Levinson, supra note 43, at 647; see also Kopel, supra note 35, at 1333 (stating that
“as long as Americans have been discussing guns and government restrictions on guns, they
have been looking to the example set by Great Britain”).
51. Vandercoy, supra note 19, at 1022 n.122.
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arms possession was a sine qua non to the preservation of liberty.52 James
Madison, the quintessential Federalist, reflected Neville’s hypothesis
when, sub nom de plume Publius, he proclaimed that “the advantage of
being armed, which the Americans possess over the people of almost
every other nation . . . forms a barrier against the enterprises of ambition,
more insurmountable than any which a simple government of any form
can admit of.”53 Madison recognized this advantage in relation to the na-
tional defense and, more importantly, emphasized the utility in preserving
political freedom from domestic threats.54 Thomas Jefferson, John Ad-
ams, and Patrick Henry concurred with Madison.55 The Antifederalist
position was expressed by the Federal Farmer, an anonymous author.56
Favoring revision of the Constitution by the inclusion of a Bill of Rights,
the Federal Farmer claimed that “to preserve liberty, it is essential that
the whole body of the people always possess arms . . . .”57
The unanimity with which Federalists and Antifederalists supported an
individual right to bear arms is a reflection of their shared philosophi-
cal and historical heritage. The unanimity in the contemporary under-
standing of the Second Amendment helps explain the relative absence
of recorded debate over it. What little debate there [was] . . . relate[d]
to James Madison’s proposal that the amendment provide that “no per-
son religiously scrupulous shall be compelled to bear arms.”58
The recorded debates do provide evidence that the Framers of the
Constitution, following Harrington’s thinking, were far more concerned
about the dangers of a standing army and congressional power over the
militia than they were about limiting the individual right to bear arms.59
While the Framers were satisfied that an armed populace would suffice to
protect against internal abuses of power, they found themselves on the
horns of a dilemma with respect to matters of national defense.60 Although
they shared Harrington’s distrust of a standing army, the Framers gener-
ally perceived that an army would be required for purposes of national de-
                                                                                                         
52. Id. at 1022.
53. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 299 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
54. See id.
55. See Andrew D. Herz, Gun Crazy: Constitutional False Consciousness and Dereliction
of Dialogic Responsibility, 75 B.U. L. REV. 57, 64 n.17 (1995).
56. See LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER TO THE REPUBLICAN 124 (Walter H. Ben-
nett ed., 1978).
57. Id.
58. Vandercoy, supra note 19, at 1022 n.123.
59. Id. at 1022 (noting the Framers’ objections to the absence of safeguards against
peacetime standing armies); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 299 n.6
(2d ed. 1988) (indicating that the Framers’ sole concern was “to prevent . . . the establishment
of a standing national army and the consequent destruction of local autonomy”).
60. Vandercoy, supra note 19, at 1022.
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fense, since the absence of a trained militia at the outbreak of war would
leave the country improperly protected.61
The Framers agreed that Congress should have the power to declare
war and to maintain land and naval forces.62 While the President was
granted the powers of Commander in Chief of the armed forces,63 the
people were to elect both the Senate and the House of Representatives.64
Since Congress was granted plenary power over the federal budget,65 the
people, acting indirectly through their elected representatives, could theo-
retically do away with the federal armed forces by eliminating the requi-
site funding.
With this compromise in place, the Framers concluded that the militia
provided an effective constitutional check on all forms of government.
The Framers recognized that the public’s ability to counteract tyranny is
promoted by individual empowerment recognized through a liberal right
to bear arms.66
C.   Something Borrowed, Something Blue
While the Framers intended to provide an individual right to bear arms
through the Second Amendment, such a right may also be derived from
the Ninth Amendment.67
The Framers resolved to protect for posterity a vast array of constitu-
tionally unenumerated rights enjoyed by the American people in 1791.68
The Framers recognized that these “common” rights, while perhaps
somewhat homespun in nature, were nonetheless inalienable and worthy
                                                                                                         
61. Id.
62. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
63. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
64. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, § 1.
65. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
66. Vandercoy, supra note 19, at 1038; see also David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism
and the Citizen Militia: The Terrifying Second Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 551, 551-52 (1991);
Kopel, supra note 35, at 1353 (“Congress intended the Second Amendment to recognize an
individual right of all free Americans to possess firearms. Congress designed the Amendment
to permit a militia drawn from the whole body of the people, thus ensuring that a uniformed
standing army would not be the sole defense of the nation.”) (providing extensive authority in
support of this proposition).
67. Nicholas J. Johnson, Beyond the Second Amendment: An Individual Right to Arms
Viewed Through the Ninth Amendment, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 3 (1992) (noting that “basic be-
liefs about [the] Constitution and the role of government” would have to be abandoned if the
existence of a Ninth Amendment-based right to arms is denied).
68. John Choon Yoo, Our Declaratory Ninth Amendment, 42 EMORY L.J. 967, 970-72
(1993) (“[T]he Ninth Amendment declares a constitutional structure designed to protect the
people from an abusive central government by securing majoritarian rights . . . . Of course,
this does not mean that the Ninth Amendment protects only majoritarian rights. Certainly the
term ‘right’ as employed in 1791 also referred to individual rights.”).
1110 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:1101
of preservation.69 The question considered by the Framers, and James
Madison in particular, was how to achieve this objective.
In the debates over ratification of the Bill of Rights, delegates com-
monly objected that it was impossible to list the rights of free men.
Speakers made reference to various common activities, questioning
whether the right to wear the hat of one’s choosing would be guaran-
teed, whether one could eat at the time one chooses, or whether one
could undertake various other individual activities without interference
from or regulation by government.70
Regardless of the label applied—homespun, natural,71 common law,72
individual,73 or fundamental74—the Framers intended the “common” rights
to be “retained by the people”75 and be incapable of alienation, even
through the democratic process.76 These “common” rights, including an
individual right to bear arms,77 eventually found their constitutional niche
in the Ninth Amendment.78
Despite the Ninth Amendment’s magnitude, Madison’s valiant effort to
protect the “common” rights has not received an appropriate measure of
legal acclaim.79 Nonetheless, the Ninth Amendment must be recognized as
a cornerstone of American freedom.80
                                                                                                         
69. Id. at 983 (“The Framers deemed these individual rights important enough to enshrine
explicitly in the Bill of Rights. They included the Ninth Amendment primarily to protect the inalien-
able rights not included in the Bill of Rights’ enumeration . . . .”).
70. Johnson, supra note 67, at 7.
71. Id. at 4.
72. Id. at 8.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 6.
75. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
76. Johnson, supra note 67, at 68 (“[T]he right to defense of self cannot be surrendered;
it is indefeasible.”); Yoo, supra note 68, at 985 (“These rights are retained precisely because
the people could not surrender them to the government, even if they so desired.”).
77. Johnson, supra note 67, at 7, 11. Johnson notes that
[o]wnership of firearms was commonplace during the revolutionary period . . . . Once
we recognize . . . and appreciate that for many Americans, firearms still are common-
place, useful tools with unmatched utility for self-defense, we might view possession of
arms for individual defense to be as basic as the right to choose a heavy coat against the
cold.
Id. at 4-5.
78. Yoo, supra note 68, at 979.
The attached phrase, “to deny or disparage,” confirms that the Ninth protects rights
outside the Constitution’s four corners. The very meaning of the words assumes the
existence of rights to be protected from denial or disparagement. Moreover,
“disparage” implies that the rights left unenumerated operate of their own force; they
are not defined residually by the interpretation of the government’s enumerated powers.
Id.
79. See discussion infra part VIII.
80. Johnson has recognized that the individual right to bear arms, anchored in the Consti-
tution by the Ninth Amendment, is essential to American liberty.
A practical rationale supporting disarmament is that some citizens cannot be trusted
to act wisely or prudently in their use of firearms. This justification, though, raises
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III.   FROM THE HALLS OF CONGRESS
The Framers, having provided the legislature with budgetary control
over the federal armed forces, expected Congress to safeguard popular
rights and liberties from encroachment by a despotic executive branch
supported by a national army.81 Given the opportunity to travel forward
through time, the Framers undoubtedly would have been flabbergasted to
find that Congress, the hoped-for staunch defender of American free-
doms, instead had repeatedly attempted to limit the people’s right to bear
arms. Despite the clear constitutional reservation of the popular right to
arms82 and the limitation of federal powers,83 the modern Congress fre-
quently turned to the Commerce Clause84 in pursuit of a gun-restrictive
agenda.85
A.   Taking the First Step
From 1791 until 1934, the popular right to arms in America remained
unimpinged by the federal government. While no federal gun control leg-
islation emerged until 1934, attempts to enact such legislation, often ra-
cially motivated, were made at the state and federal levels.86 Congress’s
opening salvo in the battle to control the American right to bear arms was
                                                                                                         
the related question: can such a population be entrusted to make informed democratic
decisions? Once we reach the stage where we advocate individual disarmament, we
may have departed substantially from the framers’ design—so substantially that, per-
haps, we will no longer seriously be able to contend that government is either con-
trolled by and serves citizens in a way that is responsive and accountable, or that
citizens possess the capacity to meet their responsibility as masters of their agents in
government.
Johnson, supra note 67, at 37.
81. See discussion supra part II.B.
82. U.S. CONST. amend. II.; see also discussion supra part II.
83. See, e.g., United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 551 (1875) (recognizing that
“[t]he government of the United States is one of delegated powers alone. Its authority is de-
fined and limited by the Constitution. All powers not granted to it by that instrument are re-
served to the States or the people.”).
84. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
85. See, e.g., James M. Maloney, Note, Shooting for an Omnipotent Congress: The
Constitutionality of Federal Regulation of Intrastate Firearms Possession, 62 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1795, 1796 (1994) (mentioning the recent use of the Commerce Clause to expand federal
jurisdiction).
86. See, e.g., Stephen P. Halbrook, Congress Interprets the Second Amendment: Decla-
rations by a Co-Equal Branch on the Individual Right To Keep and Bear Arms, 62 Tenn. L.
Rev. 597, 601 (1995) (citing 65 CONG. REC. 3946 (1924)).
Senator John K. Shields, a Tennessee Democrat, introduced a bill in the United
States Congress designed to prohibit the shipment of pistols in interstate commerce.
With racism again at the forefront, Shields inserted into the record a report in sup-
port of his bill: “Can not we, the dominant race, upon whom depends the enforce-
ment of the law, so enforce the law that we will prevent the colored people from
preying upon each other?”
Id.
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unlike subsequent measures based on the Commerce Clause. Rather,
Congress fired its second “big gun”—the taxing power.87 Responding to
the wave of violence that erupted in the United States during Prohibition
and the Great Depression,88 the National Firearms Act of 1934 imposed
an excise tax on the trade or transfer of machine guns, “sawed-off”89
shotguns, “sawed-off” rifles, and silencers.90 The National Firearms Act
also required the registration of such weapons, dealers, and transactions.91
B.   Taking the Second Step
Heartened by the successful attempt to control a limited range of
weapons, Congress proceeded to assert legislative authority to control all
firearms by enacting the Federal Firearms Act of 1938.92 This far-
reaching statute was grounded on congressional power to regulate inter-
state commerce.93
The Federal Firearms Act of 1938 prohibited any manufacturer or
dealer from transporting, shipping, or receiving any firearm or ammuni-
tion in interstate commerce without a federal license.94 Moreover, no per-
son could receive any firearm or ammunition transported or shipped in
interstate commerce in violation of the federal licensing requirement.95
Licensed manufacturers and dealers were required to maintain records of
all firearms transactions.96 The Act prohibited shipping or transporting in
interstate commerce any stolen firearm or ammunition,97 and shipping,
transporting, or knowingly receiving in interstate commerce any firearm
with an altered or removed serial number.98 The Act also forbade shipping
                                                                                                         
87. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
88. Kopel, supra note 35, at 390 (noting that “America’s first major gun control law, the
National Firearms Act of 1934, was a direct result of the violence engendered by alcohol pro-
hibition”).
89. The term “sawed-off,” while not used in the statute, is a popular expression used to
abbreviate the National Firearms Act’s more precise and extensive definition:
(1) a shotgun having a barrel or barrels of less than 18 inches in length; (2) a weapon
made from a shotgun if such weapon as modified has an overall length of less than
26 inches or a barrel or barrels of less than 18 inches in length; (3) a rifle having a
barrel or barrels of less than 16 inches in length; (4) a weapon made from a rifle if
such weapon as modified has an overall length of less than 26 inches or a barrel or
barrels of less than 16 inches in length . . . .
National Firearms Act of 1934, 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a) (1994); see also United States v. Lopez,
2 F.3d 1342, 1348 (5th Cir. 1993), aff’d, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (noting that the National
Firearms Act applies to “machine guns, ‘sawed-off’ shotguns and rifles, [and] silencers”).
90. National Firearms Act of 1934, 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-72 (1994).
91. Id. § 5802.
92. Federal Firearms Act of 1938, formerly 15 U.S.C. §§ 901-10 (repealed in 1968).
93. Id. § 902(a).
94. Id.
95. Id. § 902(b).
96. Id. § 903(d).
97. Id. § 902(g).
98. Id. § 902(i).
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or transporting in interstate commerce any firearm or ammunition to fel-
ons, persons under indictment for a felony offense, or fugitives from jus-
tice.99 Felons, indictees, and fugitives also could not ship or transport
firearms or ammunition in interstate commerce,100 nor could they receive
such materials.101
C.   Sweeping Prophylaxis
During the succeeding thirty years, congressional gun control efforts
entered a period of dormancy. Americans were evidently occupied with
more important tasks—recovering from the Depression, fighting in World
War II, and tackling a perceived threat of communism. However, gun
control resumed in June, 1968 when Congress, responding to the riots and
political assassinations that engulfed the nation from 1963 to 1968,102 re-
pealed the Federal Firearms Act and enacted the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968.103
Senator Huey Long of Louisiana, having introduced and directed the
legislation, summarized Congress’s position on the right to bear arms and
the main thrust of the Act by asserting that “every citizen could possess a
gun until the commission of his first felony. Upon his conviction, how-
ever, [this legislation] would deny every assassin, murderer, thief and
burglar . . . the right to possess a firearm . . . .”104
Four months after the enactment of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act, Congress passed the Gun Control Act of 1968.105 Dissatisfied
                                                                                                         
99. Id. § 902(d).
100. Id. § 902(e).
101. Id. § 902(f).
102. 114 CONG. REC. 14773 (1968).
103. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-28 (1994).
The Act reincorporated almost all of the provisions of the Federal Firearms Act of 1938 and
banned the transfer of firearms (other than rifles and shotguns by licensed dealers or manufac-
turers) to persons under the age of 21 or unlicensed residents of other states. Id. § 922(b). Un-
der the Act, licensed dealers and manufacturers were forbidden to transact in “destructive de-
vices” (such as bombs or missiles), machine guns, “sawed-off” shotguns, or “sawed-off” rifles
with the general public. Id. This legislation also prohibited any business from importing,
manufacturing, or dealing in firearms or ammunition without a federal license. Id. § 922(a)(1).
Similarly, the Act prohibited licensed dealers or manufacturers from selling firearms or am-
munition to felons, regardless of whether the transaction had a nexus to interstate commerce.
See id. § 922(d)(1). The federal regulation of firearms dealers and manufacturers was needed
to control the flow of firearms and ammunition affecting interstate commerce at the national
level. United States v. Nelson, 458 F.2d 556, 559 (5th Cir. 1972).
104. 114 CONG. REC. 14773 (1968).
105. Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-30 (1994). This legislation made minor
modifications to the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act. The Gun Control Act added
the following to the list of individuals prohibited from transacting in firearms through interstate
commerce channels: unlawful users of federally regulated narcotics, those adjudicated as suf-
fering from mental illness, illegal aliens, the dishonorably discharged, and such individuals as
may have renounced their United States citizenship. Id. § 922(d). The Act also restricted the
types of ammunition that could be used with firearms restricted under prior legislation and re-
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with the limited scope of prior legislation, Congress amended numerous
provisions of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act and the
National Firearms Act to create a new federal criminal offense: the use of
a firearm to commit, or the unlawful carrying of a firearm during the
commission of, “any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime . . . for
which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United States.”106 The Gun
Control Act recognized the significance of the firearms trade among gun
collectors and introduced the concept of a licensed collector defined as
any licensed person “who acquires, holds, or disposes of firearms as cu-
rios or relics. . . .”107 Rather than providing exceptions favoring gun col-
lectors, the concept of a licensed collector restricted interstate trading in
collectable firearms108 to those collectors licensed by the federal govern-
ment.109
D.   Gaining Momentum
The rate of enactment of gun-restrictive legislation escalated dramati-
cally during the 1980s and 1990s. Congress sought to respond to the at-
                                                                                                         
quired the notification of local law enforcement officials prior to the delivery or shipment of
firearms in a transaction involving a licensed firearms dealer and an unlicensed purchaser who
either fails to appear in person on the licensee’s premises or does not furnish a sworn statement
of eligibility to acquire firearms. Id. § 922(a). Licensed dealers were prohibited from selling
rifles, shotguns, or the ammunition therefor, to persons under the age of eighteen and from
selling handguns or handgun ammunition to persons under the age of twenty-one. Id. §
922(b)(1).
106. Id. § 924(c)(1).
107. Id. § 921(a)(13). The Gun Control Act amended the National Firearms Act by provid-
ing exceptions from registration requirements for antique firearms and unserviceable firearms.
26 U.S.C. § 5845(a), (g), (h) (1994). The Act defined an antique firearm as
any firearm not designed or redesigned for using rim fire or conventional center fire
ignition with fixed ammunition and manufactured in or before 1898 (including any
matchlock, flintlock, percussion cap, or similar type of ignition system or replica
thereof, whether actually manufactured before or after the year 1898) and also any
firearm using fixed ammunition manufactured in or before 1898, for which ammuni-
tion is no longer manufactured in the United States and is not readily available in the
ordinary channels of commercial trade.
Id. § 5845(g). Unserviceable firearms were recognized as “incapable of discharging a shot by
means of an explosive and incapable of being readily restored to a firing condition.” Id. § 5845(h).
While these exceptions could be interpreted as concessions to American gun collectors, the ex-
ceptions are of little practical value. Unserviceable weapons, having been deprived of their
functionality, are viewed as less than desirable and generally have significantly lower market
values than their functional counterparts. See, e.g., S.P. Fjestad, BLUE BOOK OF GUN VALUES
31 (16th ed. 1995) (noting that antique firearms that are mechanically inoperative “are gener-
ally undesirable as a collections firearm”) (referencing the National Rifle Association’s stan-
dards of conditions for antique firearms). Antique firearms, confined by their legal definition
to those firearms available up to the Spanish-American War, see 26 U.S.C. § 5845(h) (1994),
fail to include the majority of collectible weapons measured in terms of both value and trans-
actions.
108. Antique firearms were exempted from the definition of “firearm” and thus were not
subject to the interstate trading restrictions. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3) (1994).
109. Id. § 922(b).
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tempted assassinations of former Presidents Ford and Reagan,
“skyjackings,” gun-related violence in schools, and the trade in controlled
substances. In 1986, Congress enacted the Firearms Owner’s Protection
Act.110 The Undetectable Firearms Act111 and the Anti-Drug Abuse
Amendments Act112 followed soon in 1988. The turn of the decade ush-
ered in the Crime Control Act of 1990113 and the Gun-Free School Zones
Act of 1990.114 In 1993, Congress enacted the Brady Handgun Violence
                                                                                                         
110. Id. § 922(d) (extending a prohibition that originally applied only to federally licensed
parties, the new language also prohibited private parties from transferring firearms to felons,
fugitives, indictees, drug addicts, and the mentally defective). This legislation closed a loop-
hole whereby qualified private parties were legally purchasing firearms on behalf of prohibited
persons, and it was intended to prevent firearm transfers to drug addicts.
111. Id. § 922(p) (declaring illegal the manufacture, importation, sale, shipment, delivery,
possession, transfer, or receipt of any firearms not detectable by airport security devices). The
Undetectable Firearms Act was intended to eliminate “the threat posed by firearms which
could avoid detection at security checkpoints: airports, government buildings, prisons, court-
houses, [and] the White House.” H.R. REP. NO. 100-612, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988), re-
printed in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5359. While this legislation did not include an express re-
quirement of an interstate commerce nexus for the prohibition of such a firearm, the relation-
ship between the Undetectable Firearms Act’s applicability to airport passenger processing and
interstate commerce is undeniable and has never been challenged.
112. 18 U.S.C. § 924(h) (1994) (making unlawful the transfer of a firearm with knowledge
“that such firearm will be used to commit a crime of violence . . . or drug trafficking”). This
statute, like the Undetectable Firearms Act, is infirm because of the absence of an express in-
terstate commerce nexus requirement. While the drug-trafficking crimes addressed by the
statute are all federal crimes, the crimes of violence are not so limited. Id. For example, under
the Anti-Drug Abuse Amendments Act, a person transferring intrastate a firearm that was not
previously in interstate commerce and knowing that such firearm would be used in a robbery
within that same state would commit a federal crime. This is a bold stroke, even by congres-
sional standards. Congress should have known that any legislative finding regarding an inter-
state commerce nexus would foreclose a Tenth Amendment challenge, since the Supreme
Court would defer to the legislative mandate so long as any rational basis existed for the legis-
lation. Cf., Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 17 (1990); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241, 262 (1964). Any rational nexus would support the constitutionality of the
statute, yet Congress did not provide one. Accordingly, the Anti-Drug Abuse Amendments Act
appears to be unconstitutional, given the glaring absence of either a factual nexus to interstate
commerce or a congressional finding of such a nexus.
113. 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-30 (1994) (evincing the resumption of grounding gun control legis-
lation on the commerce power). While this legislation contained no bold gun control initiatives,
the technical amendments to Title 18, chapter 44 of the United States Code served to restrict
further the ability of Americans to assemble their own weapons from imported parts. See id. §
922(r). The Crime Control Act enhanced the penalty for the unlawful possession of firearms in
a federal facility, making the punishment a possible two-year prison term and fine. Id. §
930(e)(1). Additionally, the Crime Control Act expanded the definition of “moving as . . . in-
terstate or foreign commerce” to include any firearms that had, “at any time, been shipped or
transported in interstate or foreign commerce.” Id. § 922(k). Prior to this expansion, “moving
as . . . interstate or foreign commerce” was interpreted as applying only to firearms transac-
tions with attendant contemporaneous movement in interstate or foreign commerce. H.R. REP.
NO. 681, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., at 106 (1990) (explaining that the Crime Control Act would
“permit prosecution . . . where the firearms have already moved in interstate or foreign com-
merce”).
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Prevention Act (Brady I), named after James Brady, the former White
House Press Secretary shot during the 1981 attempted assassination of
former President Reagan.115
E.   Protecting the Use of Firearms
Arguably the most controversial federal gun control legislation to date,
the Public Safety and Recreational Firearms Use Protection Act of 1994116
eliminates the right to “manufacture, transfer, or possess a semiautomatic
assault weapon” unless such semiautomatic assault weapon was
“otherwise lawfully  possessed under Federal law on the date of the en-
actment of this subsection.”117 The Act banned semiautomatic assault
weapons classified under any of three categories: weapons specifically
identified within the statute; copies of the named weapons; and weapons
capable of semiautomatic firing and possessing an additional two or more
objective features detailed in a weapons characteristics checklist.118 Large
capacity ammunition magazines were also banned, subject to the same
“grandfather” provision.119 This legislation represented another reflexive
congressional reaction to public outcry following a three-year period of
                                                                                                         
114. 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a), 922(q), 924(a) (1994). The Gun-Free School Zones Act was
introduced to “ensure that our school grounds do not become battlegrounds . . . .” 136 CONG.
REC. S17595-01 (1990). The Act was later declared unconstitutional. See United States v.
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1629-34 (1995) (holding that the Gun-Free School Zone Act exceeds
congressional authority granted under the Commerce Clause).
115. 18 U.S.C. § 922(s) (1994) (limiting handgun purchases by requiring a pre-purchase
waiting period and a background check on prospective purchasers). The waiting period re-
quirement called for the passage of five business days between the time an individual contracts
to purchase a handgun and the date that possession transfers from the seller to the buyer. Id. §
922(s)(1). During those five days, local law enforcement officials were required to “make a
reasonable effort to ascertain . . . whether receipt or possession [of a handgun by the prospec-
tive buyer] would be in violation of the law.” Id. § 922(s)(2). The Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act’s background check requirement lacks a rational nexus to interstate commerce
and interferes with the states’ right to control the activities of state law enforcement personnel.
Accordingly, this statute’s constitutionality is doubtful. See Mack v. United States, 856 F.
Supp. 1372 (D. Ariz. 1994), cert. granted, 64 U.S.L.W. 3837 (U.S. June 17, 1996) (No. 95-
1503) (holding that the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act’s requirement that local law
enforcement personnel conduct a background check on prospective purchasers violates the
Tenth Amendment); see also Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503 (D. Mont. 1994),
cert. granted, 64 U.S.L.W. 3837 (U.S. June 17, 1996) (No. 95-1478); McGee v. United
States, 863 F. Supp. 321 (S.D. Miss. 1994); Frank v. United States, 860 F. Supp. 1030 (D.
Vt. 1994). However, “even if a national 7-day waiting period had been in effect in 1981, it
wouldn’t have prevented John Hinckley from buying the gun he used tragically to wound
President Reagan, White House Press Secretary Jim Brady, a Secret Service agent and a local
policeman.” 137 CONG. REC. H2831-02 (1991).
116. 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-22 (1994).
117. Id. § 922(v).
118. Id. § 921(a)(30).
119. Id. § 921(a)(31).
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spectacular and escalating violence involving semiautomatic assault weap-
ons and large capacity ammunition magazines.120
IV.   SILENCE IN THE COURT
Unlike the Congress, the Supreme Court has taken a passive role on
the subject of the right to bear arms. This judicial passivity has produced
two distinct effects. First, the Court’s silence is interpreted by anti-gun
advocates as tacit approval of gun control legislation, while pro-gun
forces, including gun collectors, decipher the Court’s inaction as silent
recognition of a constitutional or common law right to bear arms.121 Sec-
ond, in the few cases in which the Court has chosen to speak about the
right to bear arms,122 its pronouncements have been indeterminate. How-
ever, gun collectors should not take solace in the Court’s complacency.
The Court’s inertia has allowed the political process to predominate con-
stitutional law—with a resultant detrimental effect on the rights and
privileges of all firearms owners.
A.   No Right at the State Level
The Supreme Court did not address the Second Amendment until
1875, in United States v. Cruikshank.123 Cruikshank had been convicted of
violating the Enforcement Act of 1870 by “banding” and “conspiring” to
prevent two African-Americans from exercising their constitutional
rights.124 Despite concluding that the pleadings were “so defective that no
judgment of conviction should be pronounced upon them,”125 the Court
ignored the abstention principle—that federal courts should abstain from
reaching a constitutional question when there is another ground on which
the case can be decided126—and needlessly embarked upon a broad review
of constitutional law.127
                                                                                                         
120. See Michael G. Lenett, Note, Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1994: Taking a Bite Out of Violent Crime, 20 DAYTON L. REV. 573, 576-77 (1995) (noting
statistics that indicate that assault weapons are 16 times more likely to be traced to crime than
conventional weapons).
121. See discussion infra part IV.D. Pro-gun forces interpret the Court’s silence as an af-
firmation of the Court’s Miller opinion—"that Miller . . . guarantee[s] protection for any
weapon with proven military utility.” Andrew J. McClurg, The Rhetoric of Gun Control, 42
AM. U.L. REV. 53, 100 (1992); see also discussion infra part IV.B. Anti-gun advocates em-
phasize that the Court’s silence is indicative of the Court’s “disinclination to disturb” lower
court decisions favoring gun control statutes. Herz, supra note 55, at 77.
122. See discussion infra part IV.A-C.
123. 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
124. Id. at 548-49.
125. Id. at 559.
126. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 2.13(g) (5th ed.
1995).
127. See Cruishank, 92 U.S. at 548-59.
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Addressing the Second Amendment, the Cruikshank Court found that
the Constitution does not grant the right to “bear[] arms for a lawful pur-
pose.”128 According to the Court:
The [S]econd [A]mendment declares that it shall not be infringed; but
this, as has been seen, means no more than that it shall not be infringed
by Congress. This is one of the amendments that has no other effect
than to restrict the powers of the national government, leaving the
people to look for their protection against any violation by their fellow-
citizens of the rights it recognizes, to what is called, in The City of
New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 139, the “powers which relate to merely
municipal legislation, or what was, perhaps, more properly called in-
ternal police,” “not surrendered or restrained by the Constitution of the
United States.”129
In Cruikshank, the Court failed to recognize that the Ninth Amend-
ment—“[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people”130—
guarantee the continued enjoyment by American citizens of the common
law rights inherited from their English forefathers.131 These innate com-
mon law rights include the right to bear arms.132 Furthermore, the Court
failed to account for the Fourteenth Amendment’s restriction upon the
states’ police power—“No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States.”133
Ten years later, in Presser v. Illinois,134 the Court again reviewed the
Second Amendment. Herman Presser had been convicted of violating the
Illinois Military Code for unlawfully belonging to, and parading and
drilling with, “an unauthorized body of men with arms, who had associ-
ated themselves together as a military company and organization, without
having a license from the governor, and not being a part of, or belonging
to, ‘the regular organized volunteer militia’ of the state of Illinois, or the
troops of the United States.”135
In affirming Presser’s conviction, the Court cited Cruikshank and
Miln.136 Like the Cruikshank Court, the Presser Court did not consider the
                                                                                                         
128. Id. at 553.
129. Id. (citations omitted).
130. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
131. See discussion supra part II.C; Johnson, supra note 67, at 3 (explaining that an indi-
vidual right to arms may be derived from the Ninth Amendment).
132. Vandercoy, supra note 19, at 1017; supra notes 68-80 and accompanying text.
133. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
134. 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
135. Id. at 254 (quoting the indictment against Presser).
136. Id. at 265-68 (citing City of New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 102, 139 (1837)). In Miln,
the Court considered the extent of the state police power prior to the Fourteenth Amendment.
Miln, 11 Pet. at 139. Miln explains that
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Ninth Amendment in reaching a decision. Nonetheless, the Presser Court
managed to draw an appropriate conclusion regarding the applicability of
the Second Amendment:
It is undoubtedly true that all citizens capable of bearing arms consti-
tute the reserved military force or reserve militia of the United States
as well as of the States, and, in view of this prerogative of the general
government, as well as of its general powers, the States cannot, even
laying the constitutional provision in question out of view, prohibit the
people from keeping and bearing arms, so as to deprive the United
States of their rightful resource for maintaining the public security, and
disable the people from performing their duty to the general govern-
ment.137
The Presser Court proceeded to address the Fourteenth Amendment is-
sue not previously raised in Cruikshank. The Court noted that the Four-
teenth Amendment precluded state action to “abridge the privileges or im-
munities of citizens of the United States.”138 The Court understood that
among these privileges or immunities was a protection against state attempts
to deny an individual right to arms or to preclude citizens from service as
members of the militia.139 Despite having recognized Presser’s right to serve
in the militia, the Court was able to uphold the Supreme Court of Illinois by
failing to enforce the Second Amendment at the state level140 and by finding
that the Constitution did not provide Presser with a right “to associate with
others as a military company, and to drill and parade with arms.”141
In reaching this circuitous and contorted holding, the Court affirmed
the Miln decision—that state police power may be wielded to secure the
“general welfare by any and every act of legislation . . . not surrendered
or restrained” by the Constitution.142 The Court’s vague and limited con-
                                                                                                         
[i]t is not only the right, but the bounded and solemn duty of a state, to advance the
safety, happiness, and prosperity of its people, and to provide for its general welfare,
by any and every act of legislation which it may deem to be conducive to these ends;
where the power over the particular subject, or the manner of its exercise, are not
surrendered or restrained by the constitution of the United States.
Id.
137. 116 U.S. at 265.
138. Id. at 266 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XIV).
139. Id. at 265.
140. In effect, Cruikshank and Presser held that the Second Amendment applies solely
against the federal government. See O’Hare & Pedreira, supra note 19, at 191-92. O’Hare and
Pedreira note that the states’ rights argument
cannot withstand close scrutiny because it relies upon [Cruikshank and Presser,
which] were decided before the concept of incorporation was adopted. Nonetheless,
because of the Supreme Court’s rejection of “the proposition that the entire Bill of
Rights applies to the states,” a number of federal and state courts refuse to incorpo-
rate the Second Amendment against state governments.
Id.
141. Presser, 116 U.S. at 266.
142. Id. at 268.
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clusion left two key questions that have been the subjects of much de-
bate.143 To what extent is the right to bear arms linked with or limited by
the duty of service in the militia, and to what extent may states regulate
the right to bear arms by limiting militia activities or exercising police
power?
B.   Civilian Soldiers
After a fifty-four-year hiatus from Second Amendment considerations,
the Court addressed the National Firearms Act in United States v.
Miller.144 Miller had been indicted for the unlawful transport in interstate
commerce of a double barrel twelve-gauge shotgun having a barrel less
than eighteen inches in length.145 The indictment had been quashed at the
district court level for violation of the Second Amendment.146 In a case
where no appearance was made by the appellee,147 where no record evi-
dence was before the Court,148 and where the Court erroneously refused to
take judicial notice that the “sawed-off” shotgun was utilized in contem-
poraneous military service,149 the Court concluded that the Second
Amendment does not guarantee the right to bear a weapon that does not
have “some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a
well regulated militia.”150
The Miller Court engaged in a limited historical analysis of the Court’s
previous linkage of the right to bear arms with the duty of service in the
militia, and it specifically found that “the [m]ilitia comprised all males
physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense.”151 In so
doing, the Court, though failing to address the Ninth Amendment ex-
pressly, noted the common law implied obligation of all adult males to
possess arms and ammunition.152
Courts and pro-gun control commentators responded to the Miller
opinion by attempting to limit the decision to its facts and describing the
decision as adequate only to dispose of the case.153 Despite this view,
Miller remains an affirmation of the constitutional protection of the popular
                                                                                                         
143. See generally Vandercoy, supra note 19; Levinson, supra note 43; Herz, supra note
55; Richard M. Aborn, The Battle over the Brady Bill and the Future of Gun Control Advo-
cacy, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 417 (1995).
144. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
145. Id. at 175.
146. Id. at 177.
147. Id. at 175.
148. Herz, supra note 55, at 68.
149. Id.
150. 307 U.S. at 178.
151. Id. at 179.
152. Id. at 179-80.
153. See, e.g., Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 922-23 (1st Cir. 1942), cert. denied,
319 U.S. 770 (1943); Herz, supra note 55, at 69.
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right to keep and bear military weapons.154 Moreover, further consideration
of three key factors—the Miller Court’s interpretation that the Second
Amendment grants citizens the right to keep and bear military weapons,
the fact that machine guns were used in military service on the date of the
opinion, and the National Firearms Act’s ban on such weapons—
inevitably leads to the conclusion that the Miller decision could not have
been complete without a resounding judicial proclamation of the National
Firearms Act’s unconstitutionality.
C.   Armed Convicts
Forty-one years elapsed before the Court again considered questions
surrounding the right to bear arms. In Lewis v. United States,155 the Court
considered whether a convicted felon could be convicted of possessing a
firearm shipped in interstate commerce in derogation of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.156 The Court noted “that a
legislature constitutionally may prohibit a convicted felon from engaging
in activities far more fundamental than the possession of a firearm.”157
For example, the Court previously upheld the legislative denial of a con-
victed felon’s right to vote.158 Applying only rational basis scrutiny and
availing itself of the strict construction and plain meaning jurisprudential
principles, the Lewis Court found the defendant to be a convicted felon
and affirmed his consequently illegal possession conviction.159
D.   The Petition for Writ of Certiorari Is Denied
Both sides of the gun debate have argued about the significance of the
Court’s steady stream of certiorari denials. The Miller case, for example,
concluded with the most radical and controversial judicial expression on
the subject of gun rights. Yet, for fifty-seven years, the Court refused to
address lower court cases that, for the most part, have run contrary to the
Miller holding.160 The Court’s track record of certiorari denials on these
                                                                                                         
154. Levinson, supra note 43, at 654-55 (“Ironically, Miller can be read to support some
of the most extreme anti-gun control arguments, e.g., that the individual citizen has a right to
keep and bear bazookas, rocket launchers and other armaments that are clearly relevant to
modern warfare, including, of course, assault weapons.”); see also Vandercoy, supra note 19,
at 1009 (“[The Second Amendment] right envisioned was not only the right to be armed, but to
be armed at a level equal to the government.”).
155. 445 U.S. 55 (1980).
156. Id. at 56.
157. Id. at 66.
158. See id. (citing Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974)).
159. Id. at 60-68.
160. See, e.g., Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319
U.S. 770 (1943); United States v. Tomlin, 454 F.2d 176 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 924
(1972); United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976);
Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863
(1983); Farmer v. Higgins, 907 F.2d 1041 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1047
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cases is particularly disturbing since a denial of certiorari must be inter-
preted as making no comment on the merits of the case.161
Farmer v. Higgins162 illustrates this point. In Farmer, a conservative
Court led by Chief Justice Rehnquist denied certiorari to a case in which
the Eleventh Circuit held that, pursuant to the Firearms Owners’ Protec-
tion Act of 1986, the making and manufacture of new machine guns for
possession by private persons was illegal.163 The Eleventh Circuit’s ruling
in Farmer was in direct conflict with Miller’s implicit holding that citi-
zens have a right to possess, and therefore presumably a right to manufac-
ture, “ordinary military equipment. . . .”164 Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court exercised its constitutional prerogative not to take the case.
The plaintiff in Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove165 was likewise de-
nied an opportunity for debate before the Court. In Quilici, the Village of
Morton Grove’s board of trustees banned the possession, both in and out
of the home, of numerous weapons including all handguns.166 The village
acted, pursuant to the police power, upon a finding that “handguns play a
major role in the commission of homicide, aggravated assault, and armed
robbery, and accidental injury and death.”167 Quilici and a host of other
plaintiffs challenged the ordinance’s constitutionality under the Second,
Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments but were denied relief in federal dis-
trict court168 and, subsequently, in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.169
The Seventh Circuit’s decision commenced on an ominous note, with
the court acknowledging that it considered gun control (and not gun
                                                                                                         
(1991); United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1614
(1993); United States v. Kozerski, 518 F. Supp. 1082 (D.N.H. 1981), aff’d mem., 740 F.2d
952 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 842 (1984); United States v. Sandidge, 520 A.2d 1057
(D.D.C.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 868 (1987).
161. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Gomez, 116 S. Ct. 488 (1995) (stating that “an order denying
a petition for certiorari expresses no opinion on the merits of the case”); Missouri v. Jenkins,
115 S. Ct. 2038, 2047 (1995) (quoting United States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482 (1923)) (stating
that “the denial of a writ of certiorari imports no expression of opinion upon the merits of the
case, as the bar has been told many times”); Barber v. Tennessee, 115 S. Ct. 1177 (1995)
(citing Carver, 260 U.S. at 490) (restating “the settled proposition that this Court’s denial of
certiorari does not constitute a ruling on the merits”). Despite the Court’s avowed position on
the effect (or lack thereof) of certiorari denials, the Court’s track record in gun control cases is
described as “particularly disturbing” because certiorari denials allow lower court decisions to
create or uphold laws in derogation of the right to arms. Herz, supra note 55, at 77 (“Although
orthodox understanding views a denial of certiorari as making no comment on the merits, the
Court’s long-standing laissez-faire attitude indicates, at a minimum, a deep disinclination to
disturb existing doctrine.”).
162. 907 F.2d 1041 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1047 (1991).
163. Id. at 1042.
164. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939).
165. 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S 863 (1983).
166. Id. at 264.
167. Id.
168. Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 532 F. Supp. 1169 (N.D.Ill. 1981).
169. Quilici, 695 F.2d at 261-64.
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rights) “of vital importance to every citizen” and thus finding abstention
to be no more important here than in cases involving fundamental
rights.170 From the outset,171 the Seventh Circuit declined to grant the right
to bear arms the status of a fundamental right.172
The court initially analyzed the Illinois Constitution and found that
“the right to keep and bear arms . . . is so limited by the police power
that a ban on handguns does not violate that right.”173 The court concluded
that because the ordinance did not prohibit all firearms, “Morton Grove
[could] exercise its police power [under the Illinois Constitution] to pro-
hibit handguns even though this prohibition interferes with an individual’s
liberty or property.”174
The court noted that Presser did not apply the Second Amendment to
the States.175 The court explained that the Supreme Court never intended
to incorporate the entire Bill of Rights and dismissed Quilici’s Second and
Fourteenth Amendment argument.176 The Seventh Circuit also summarily
dismissed Quilici’s Ninth Amendment argument.177 Despite an incontro-
vertible historical foundation for the common law right to bear arms and
an equally undeniable record of the constitutional Framers’ intentions as
to the Second and Ninth Amendments,178 the court concluded: “Since ap-
pellants [could] not cite, and our research [did not reveal], any Supreme
Court case holding that any specific right is protected by the Ninth
Amendment, appellants’ argument has no legal significance.”179
V.   FUTURE SHOCK
Gun control activists are on a quest to disarm the American populace
and take away the rights of gun collectors. The anti-gun activists’ regula-
tory ladder has four “rungs,” each incrementally more restrictive.180
                                                                                                         
170. Id. at 265.
171. See, e.g., Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1885); United States v. Miller, 307
U.S. 174, 179-80 (1939).
172. Quilici, 695 F.2d at 271.
173. Id. at 267.
174. Id. at 268.
175. Id. at 269.
176. Id. at 270 (finding that “[t]he Supreme Court has specifically rejected the proposition
that the entire Bill of Rights applies to the states through the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment”).
177. Id. at 271.
178. See discussion supra part II.
179. Quilici, 695 F.2d at 271. Quilici featured Judge Coffey’s well-considered dissenting
opinion that may have been intended to whet the Supreme Court’s certiorian appetite. Id. at
271-80 (Coffey, J., dissenting). Judge Coffey highlighted the Village of Morton Grove’s vio-
lation of the Court’s oft-recognized and oft-defended fundamental right to privacy within the
home. Id. at 279. The Court’s desire silently to support lower court rulings in contravention of
the right to bear arms has been so strong that the Court, in denying certioria to Quicili, seemed
willing to sacrifice the invocation and application of the Court’s cherished right to privacy.
180. See, e.g., Lenett, supra note 120, at 614-15 (noting that there are four possible tiers
of gun regulation).
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Fourth-rung legislation—“a prospective freeze [only,] without licensing, reg-
istration, or any other means of controlling weapons currently in circula-
tion”—is viewed by the anti-gun lobby as minimally intrusive on gun
owners’ rights and, therefore, worthy of rapid follow-up.181 Third-rung
legislation involves “a prospective [manufacturing] ban with a system of
prospective licensing and registration of transfers of grandfathered weap-
ons” and is the current goal of anti-gun forces.182 “Second-rung” legisla-
tive efforts encompass a ban on the prospective manufacture and sale of
all firearms together with a system for the licensing and registration of all
firearms then in circulation.183 First-rung legislation would represent the
pinnacle of the anti-gun forces’ scheme. This ultimate measure would
foreclose the need for regulatory efforts by criminalizing the manufacture,
sale, importation, receiving, and possession of any firearm.184 Such legis-
lation would necessarily embrace the confiscation of firearms, thereby
triggering direct confrontation with the Fifth Amendment and direct in-
fringement of the rights of gun collectors.185
Inspired by mounting successes on both the legislative186 and judicial
fronts, gun control advocates are expected to continue their quest to dis-
arm the American populace after passage of the Public Safety and Rec-
reational Firearms Use Protection Act.187 In keeping with these expecta-
tions, the Gun Violence Prevention Bill, more commonly known as
“Brady II,” was introduced in the Senate and the House of Representa-
tives in 1994.188 This proposed legislation contained six principal direc-
tives: to license handgun purchasers prospectively; to require that all
transfers of handguns be registered with local law enforcement agencies;
to extend the waiting period prior to the transfer of a handgun from five
days to seven days; to declare unlawful the leaving of a loaded firearm, or
                                                                                                         
181. Id.
182. Id. at 614.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 611-12 (claiming that the successes registered by the anti-gun forces during the
103d Congress “broke forever the image of NRA invulnerability and gun control as a taboo
subject of federal legislation”).
187. 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-22 (1994); see also supra part III.E.
188. See H.R. 3932, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1993); S. 1882, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1993).
The Gun Violence Prevention Bill was not enacted by the 103d Congress. Allen G. Breed,
Flea Market Handgun Sales Seen as Criminals’ Loophole, THE CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Jan.
16, 1995, at P1A. The bill has not been reintroduced in the Republican-controlled Congress
although Handgun Control Inc. continues to lobby for the measure. Id. Handgun Control Inc.
is a Washington, D.C.-based lobbying group that was instrumental in the passage of the Brady
Handgun Violence Prevention Act (Brady I). Id.; 137 CONG. REC. H2840 (1991) (statement of
Rep. Marlenee, Repub.) (“Of course, Handgun Control, Inc. wants the Brady bill passed. That
is exactly why. Handgun control.”). James Brady, former President Reagan’s press secretary,
is a member of Handgun Control, Inc.’s board of directors, and his wife, Sarah, is the organi-
zation’s chair. Larry King Live (CNN television broadcast, Mar. 27, 1996) (The Bradys de-
cried the Second Amendment as “a fraud on the American people.”).
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unloaded firearm with accessible ammunition, so situated that a person
under the age of sixteen could gain control of the weapon; to require
handgun manufacturers to provide a safety device that would preclude
discharge of the weapon by a person under the age of seven; and, most
significantly, to eliminate that category of handguns known as “Saturday
Night Specials.”189
Since the Public Safety and Recreational Firearms Use Protection
Act190 may be fairly classified as a fourth-rung legislative measure, Brady
II was a follow-up endeavor to reach a higher regulatory plateau.191 Brady
II constituted the anti-gun lobby’s legislative attempt to reach the third
rung of its self-proclaimed regulatory ladder and, had it passed, would
have represented a solid victory, given the strong Republican presence in
both Houses of Congress and the National Rifle Association’s view that
licensing and registration of gun owners are anathema.192 Because the
measure failed, anti-gun forces will undoubtedly regroup for another at-
tempt at passing similar legislation.193
Looking further ahead, the anti-gun lobby anticipates second- and first-
rung legislation. For example, the Violence Policy Center, an anti-gun
think tank located in Washington, D.C., has already prepared a legislative
plan intended to be a halfway measure between the second and first rungs
on the regulatory ladder. The Violence Policy Center’s “baby step” ap-
                                                                                                         
189. H.R. 3932, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1993); S. 1882, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1993)
(defining Saturday Night Specials as handguns whose barrels, slides, frames, or receivers are
made of nonhomogeneous metals that melt or deform at temperatures less than 800 degrees; or
pistols without safety mechanisms that meet specific criteria; or handguns that fail to meet
minimum length and height requirements).
190. 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-22 (1994).
191. Lenett, supra note 120, at 614.
192. Id. The National Rifle Association was instrumental in assisting “the Republican
Party [to] gain control of Congress in the 1994 elections with massive campaign contribu-
tions.” James Rosen, House Vote To Repeal Assault-Weapons Ban Won’t Withstand Veto;
Democratic Congressmen Accuse Speaker Newt Gingrich of Bowing to the National Rifle As-
sociation, THE FRESNO BEE, Mar. 23, 1996, at A1. While conservative Republicans in the
House of Representatives recently engineered the passage of a bill repealing the Public Safety
and Recreational Firearms Use Protection Act, the majority was insufficient to override a
promised veto by President Clinton. Id.; David Hess, House Repeals Weapons Ban; Not Veto
Proof: The Bill Isn’t Likely To Get Out of the Senate and President Clinton Has Promised To
Veto It, THE POST & COURIER, Mar. 23, 1996, at A1. Although the Republican majority has
proved insufficient to overturn existing gun control statutes, the Republican presence has tem-
porarily derailed pro-gun control forces in their attempts to pursue more restrictive legislation.
Naftali Bendavid, Readying for a New Assault; After Hard-Won Gains, Gun Control Advocates
Face the Prospect of Losing Ground in a Revamped Congress, THE RECORDER, Nov. 22,
1994, at 1 (quoting Sarah Brady, Chair, Handgun Control Inc.) (“Obviously, with the Repub-
lican landslide, the hopes for a lot of positive action on our part are greatly diminished.”).
193. See H.R. 3932, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1993); S. 1882, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1993).
The Gun Violence Prevention Bill was not enacted by the 103d Congress. Allen G. Breed,
Flea Market Handgun Sales Seen As Criminals’ Loophole, THE CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Jan.
16, 1995, at P1A. The bill has not been reintroduced in the Republican-controlled Congress
although Handgun Control Inc. continues to lobby for the measure. Id.
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proach calls for a complete ban on handguns and on all other firearms capable
of accepting detachable ammunition magazines.194 Accordingly, Ameri-
cans would be allowed to retain their current rights with respect to fixed
capacity rifles and shotguns but all other arms would be subject to confis-
cation.195 The Violence Policy Center’s plan would also severely restrict
ammunition transactions by establishing monthly limits on the number of
rounds that individual customers could purchase and by precluding am-
munition transactions from sources other than local law enforcement
agencies or Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms-operated ammuni-
tion sales centers.196 The Violence Policy Center’s plan thus raises Fifth
Amendment questions not only on the issue of confiscation, but also on
the issue of significant limitation of the gun owner’s right to property en-
joyment occasioned by severely restricted ammunition availability.
While gun collectors decried fourth-rung statutes as infringing upon
hallowed constitutional rights, their lamentations were disingenuous. Gun
collectors profited handsomely from fourth-rung gun control legislation.197
Fourth-rung statutes served to limit the supply of weapons while fueling
demand from a public concerned about future gun-restrictive legislation.198
For example, demand surge following the passage of the Public Safety
and Recreational Firearms Use Protection Act resulted in a trebling of
prices, on average, for the impacted firearms and accessories.199
Third-rung legislation, while threatening to dampen the demand for
firearms through licensing and registration requirements, would actually
propel gun prices to extreme levels as supply responds to a manufacturing
ban.200 Accordingly, gun collectors will continue their half-hearted rights
infringement protestations while privately making substantial profits.201
                                                                                                         
194. Herz, supra note 55, at 151 n.424 (citing Josh Sugarmann & Kirsten Rand, Cease
Fire: A Comprehensive Strategy To Reduce Firearms Violence 2 (1994) (discussing the Vio-
lence Policy Center’s “comprehensive regulatory approach to firearms”)).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Massad Ayoob, In the Time of Brady, A Dealer’s Responsibilities Continue To Grow;
Brady Handgun Prevention Act, 39 SHOOTING INDUSTRY 18, 18 (1994) (“The good news is
that business is up, not just from old customers who see the grim legislative situation as the last
chance to stock up on enough guns for themselves and their heirs, but from first-time gun pur-
chasers.”); Interview with Harry L. Coe, IV, supra note 6.
198. Herz, supra note 55, at 151 n.424.
199. Id. (citing the price of the 15-round capacity Glock magazine that moved from $32 at
the time of passage to $100); see generally Joe Poyer, Bonus Buyers’ Guide, GUNS & AMMO,
June 1994, at 76, 78 (discussing gun pricing in general and citing the “Australian-made Lith-
gow L1A1s [whose] . . . price has more than tripled”).
200. Interview with Harry L. Coe, IV, supra note 6; Telephone Interview with Wain Rob-
erts, supra note 8. Mr. Roberts described the demand surge and price increases following the
passage of the Public Safety and Recreational Firearms Use Protection Act. Telephone Inter-
view with Wain Roberts, supra note 8. He concurred in the probable likelihood of a resur-
gence in demand and a resumption of dramatic price increases following the possible passage
of third-rung legislation. Id. However, Mr. Roberts also described the present market as ane-
mic, given the relative market security induced by the Republican Congress. Id. “It seems that if
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Second-rung legislation, distinguished by the addition of a firearms
sales ban to the manufacturing ban, would allow gun collectors to con-
tinue the quiet enjoyment of their hobby’s aesthetic aspects but would
eliminate all legal possibilities for the collector to enlarge his collection
and would also eradicate the profit incentive in all but the black market.
Additionally, the gun collector would realize an economic “total loss” from
the extinguishment of his gun inventory’s fair market value. Should second-
rung legislation survive Second and Ninth Amendment challenge, the gun
collector must argue that his lost economic value is compensable under the
Fifth Amendment.202
At the first rung, again assuming that the legislation could survive
Second and Ninth Amendment challenges, the gun collector would be left
with nothing at all. His weapons would be confiscated—“taken” for pub-
lic purposes—thereby implicating the Fifth Amendment.203
VI.   THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution proclaims that
“private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compen-
sation.”204 This legal maxim (hereinafter referred to as “takings” or “the
takings clause”) emanates from the natural law philosophy of eminent
domain that bestows upon sovereigns the power to take privately owned
property under a moral obligation justly to compensate the deprived prop-
erty owner.205 The federal government may exercise the power of eminent
domain only in conjunction with an exercise of enumerated or implied
powers.206 Individual state governments may act under power of eminent
domain for any purpose that is not violative of the Constitution.207
Under well-settled takings jurisprudence, when government takes title
or actual possession of private property, the former owner must be com-
pensated.208 This process of taking property by virtue of eminent domain
                                                                                                         
[the gun control lobby] wants to reduce the supply of firearms, they would be better served not to
pursue gun control legislation and watch the dealers—large and small—go out of business from a lack
of demand.” Id.
201. Interview with Harry L. Coe, IV, supra note 6; Telephone Interview with Wain Rob-
erts, supra note 8.
202. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.
204. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
205. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 126, § 11.11 (noting that the Fifth Amendment
“was not seen as creating a new legal restriction . . . but rather as recognizing the existence of
a principle of natural justice”).
206. See id.
207. See id.
208. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 425-26
(1982) (finding that a minor occupation is a taking requiring compensation).
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is known as condemnation.209 In an inverse condemnation case, the former
private property owner may seek compensation by alleging that the gov-
ernment has taken the subject property without an action in condemna-
tion.210
Unlike the federal government, which is limited by enumerated pow-
ers, a state government acts in accordance with an “immense mass of
legislation,” collectively referred to as the state’s “police power.”211 The
term “police power” refers generally to a government’s inherent power to
take action in promoting the public health, safety, welfare, or morals.212
When used in the takings arena, police power generally refers to regula-
tion, not physical possession, of land and property use for the public wel-
fare without the payment of compensation.213
Under police power justification, state governments began to impose
land and property use restrictions upon private property owners.214 At
times, such restrictions resulted in significant diminution of property val-
ues without compensation to property owners.215 States exploited the po-
lice power to reserve property for public use without condemnation pro-
ceedings and, more importantly, without the need to assess taxes for
compensation of dispossessed property owners.216
Responding to perceived property rights encroachment by state gov-
ernments, property owners complained to the courts that such police
power actions were de facto takings.217 Court decisions attempted to bal-
ance the facts on a case-by-case basis seeking to achieve fairness.218 De-
pending upon judicial proclivity and perspective of the facts, decisions
                                                                                                         
209. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 292 (6th ed. 1990); see also Department of Transp. v.
Lundberg, 825 P.2d 641, 643 n.1 (Or. 1992).
210. See, e.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987) (recognizing landowner’s right to seek compensation by
bringing an action in inverse condemnation of land).
211. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 126, § 8.2 (noting that the police power is not
mentioned in the Constitution but is cited often in constitutional law cases).
212. See id. § 11.10.
213. See id.
214. See id.
215. See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (allowing the economic value of a
brewery to be destroyed by state legislation prohibiting the production of alcoholic beverages
and holding that a “prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that are declared .
. . to be injurious to the health, morals or safety of the community, cannot, in any just sense,
be deemed a taking or an appropriation of property for the public benefit”).
216. See generally E.F. Roberts, Mining with Mr. Justice Holmes, 39 VAND. L. REV.
287, 293 (1986).
217. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (involving owners
of subsurface mining rights who complained that a Pennsylvania statute severely restricted the
mining of coal).
218. Nicholas V. Morosoff, Note, “‘Take’ My Beach, Please!”: Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission and a Rational-Nexus Constitutional Analysis of Development Exactions,
69 B.U. L. REV. 823, 837 (1989) (acknowledging that courts have had problems in determin-
ing when a regulation goes “‘too far’”).
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were handed down in a patchwork fashion, alternately finding unreasonable
confiscation in violation of the Fifth Amendment or justified regulation
due to substantial relation to the public welfare.219
A.   Invasion!
In 1868, the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution made the tak-
ings clause of the Fifth Amendment applicable to the states.220 Pumpelly v.
Green Bay Co.,221 was progressing through the federal courts at approxi-
mately that time. In Pumpelly, the plaintiff sought damages for the flood-
ing of 640 acres of land pursuant to the statutorily authorized construction
of a dam.222 The defendant asserted that damages were not due because
the land had not been physically “taken or appropriated.”223 Although the
Supreme Court heard this case under the Wisconsin takings clause, it
noted that the state’s constitutional provision was “almost identical” to the
federal provision and held that a taking could occur by means other than
an “absolute conversion” of the property.224
B.   Confronting the Police Power
Sixteen years after Pumpelly, the Court addressed a takings claim
brought by a brewery owner following Kansas’s prohibition of the manu-
facture or sale of alcoholic beverages. In Mugler v. Kansas,225 the Court
deliberated the issue of state police power at its zenith. Acting in further-
ance of public health, safety, and morality, Kansas had outlawed the
manufacture and sale of alcoholic beverages and declared Mugler’s brew-
ery a common nuisance.226 Kansas deemed Mugler’s economic loss un-
worthy of compensation, and the Court agreed.227 The elder Justice Harlan
delivered the opinion of the Court:
The exercise of the police power by the destruction of property which
is itself a public nuisance, or the prohibition of its use in a particular
way, whereby its value becomes depreciated, is very different from
taking property for public use, or from depriving a person of his prop-
                                                                                                         
219. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 126, § 11.12(a) (stating that Supreme Court
rulings follow no clear theoretical guidelines); see also Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n,
483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987) (noting the absence of standards for defining “legitimate state inter-
est” or “substantially advance”).
220. See, e.g., Webb’s Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 160 (1980).
221. 80 U.S. 166, 181 (1871) (finding a compensable taking of property where the “real
estate is actually invaded by superinduced additions of water, earth, sand, or other material”).
222. Id. at 166.
223. Id. at 174.
224. Id. at 177.
225. 123 U.S. 623, 668-71 (1887) (holding that a statute preventing the injurious use of
property does not effect a compensable taking).
226. Id. at 669.
227. Id.
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erty without due process of law. In the one case, a nuisance only is
abated; in the other, unoffending property is taken away from an inno-
cent owner.228
The Court was seemingly unimpressed by the apparent injustice and
dramatic turn of events inflicted upon the business owner. Mugler’s busi-
ness, recently a model of American ingenuity and free enterprise, had
been statutorily converted, virtually overnight, to a common nuisance.
The Court refused to make any allowance for the fact that Mugler’s sig-
nificant investment had been made at a time when brewing alcoholic bev-
erages was legal in Kansas or for the fact that Mugler’s economic loss
was being occasioned by a change in organized society’s standards of mo-
rality. Following Mugler, state legislatures received the message that so
long as legislative or regulatory actions could be veiled under cloak of
concern over the health, morals, or safety of the public, states would not
be burdened with the requirement of compensating the affected property
owners for economic losses they might sustain.229
C.   Going How Far?
In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,230 the Court encountered a Penn-
sylvania statute forbidding coal mining that could result in subsidence
damage to surface improvements.231 The statute was enacted pursuant to
public concern that coal companies had sold lands subject to deed reser-
vations allowing the coal companies to mine regardless of subsidence
damage.232 Justice Holmes observed that property purchasers had realized
economic benefit from the reduced land prices that they negotiated with
the coal companies in return for the mining rights reservations.233 These
same purchasers subsequently utilized the Pennsylvania statute to effect a
                                                                                                         
228. Id.
229. See Allison B. Waters, Takings—City Planners Must Bear the Burden of Rough Pro-
portionality in Exactions and Land Use Regulation, Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309
(1994), 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 267, 274-75 (1996) (citing Mugler, "[T]he Supreme Court carved
out the police power exception to the Takings Clause: the government need not compensate
landowners for governmental takings of private property which are necessary to protect public health,
safety and welfare. The police power exception is still available to [state and local] government . . .
.”); J. Kelly Strader, Taking the Wind Out of the Government’s Sails?: Forfeitures and Just
Compensation, 23 PEPP. L. REV. 449, 455 (1996) (“The Mugler decision and its progeny
came to be known for the proposition that the government may regulate a ‘harmful’ or
‘noxious’ use of public property without paying just compensation.”).
230. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
231. Id. at 393 (noting that protection of private property in the Fifth Amendment presup-
poses that it is wanted for public use but provides that it shall not be taken for such use without
compensation).
232. Id. at 395.
233. Id. at 415 (asserting that those “so short sighted as to acquire only surface rights
without the right of support” should not be afforded judicial relief anymore than they should be
allowed to take the right in the first place and refuse to pay for it).
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denial of the coal companies’ share of the bargain.234 Noting that the stat-
ute had simply gone “too far” in contradiction of contract and property
law, the Court refused to convey to the property purchasers “greater
rights than they bought.”235
In Pennsylvania Coal, the unsuccessful attempt to invalidate a mining
company’s property rights by statutory means was arguably motivated by
the desire to protect the public health, safety, and welfare.236 This tactic,
which had been deployed successfully to deprive Mugler of the entire
value of his business, should have prevailed in Pennsylvania Coal, given
stare decisis and the Mugler decision.237 However, Justice Holmes was not
interested in the Mugler argument and did not address that case in Pennsyl-
vania Coal. Justice Holmes found greater cause for alarm in the attempted
unilateral contract invalidation and the magnitude of the loss in economic
value that would have been imposed upon the mining company thereby:238
[S]ome values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield
to the police power. But obviously the implied limitation must have its
limits or the contract and due process clauses are gone. One fact for
consideration in determining such limits is the extent of the diminution.
When it reaches a certain magnitude . . . there must be an exercise of
eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act.239
Accordingly, Pennsylvania Coal stands for the principle that the
greater the magnitude of property value diminution, the greater the prob-
ability that a taking has occurred.240 The holding implies the existence of a
continuum between the police power and eminent domain.241 Once a stat-
ute or regulation has gone “too far” in depriving the property owner of
economic value, the statutory or regulatory impact is deemed a taking.242
D.   Timber!
In 1928, the Court, in Miller v. Schoene243 considered a Virginia stat-
ute providing for the compulsory destruction of red cedar trees within two
miles of an apple orchard when red cedar trees were found to be the
                                                                                                         
234. Id.
235. Id. at 416.
236. Id. at 397 (The “plaintiffs in error” claimed that the Kohler Act was enacted “to pro-
tect the lives and safety of the public.”).
237. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 126, § 11.12(a) (noting that Justice Harlan’s
opinion in Mugler limited the recognition of a taking to cases of governmental property appro-
priation and thereby conflicted with Justice Holmes’ concern with fairness and the degree of
interference with property as expressed in Pennsylvania Coal).
238. 260 U.S. at 413 (questioning “whether the police power [could] be stretched so far”).
239. Id.
240. Id.; see NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 126, § 11.12(a).
241. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 126, § 11.12(a).
242. See 260 U.S. at 415.
243. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
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source of the communicable plant disease called cedar rust.244 Cedar rust
was found to damage apple orchards severely, and destruction of the host
cedars was viewed as the only practical means of saving the apple trees.245
The owner was allowed to recover salvage value from the cut trees, but
compensation was not allowed for the destruction-driven reduction in
market value of the trees or the grove.246 The Supreme Court, although
finding that the economic value of cedars in Virginia was small compared
with that of the apple orchards, found the statute constitutional.247 The
Court noted that “[w]hen forced to such a choice the state does not exceed
its constitutional powers by deciding upon the destruction of one class of
property in order to save another which, in the judgment of the legisla-
ture, is of greater value to the public.”248
E.   Mounting Confusion
From 1929 through 1987, the Court’s decisions in takings cases ex-
hibited conflicts and inconsistencies resulting from the irreconcilability of
the principles avowed in Mugler and Pennsylvania Coal.249 The following
cases are reflective of the mounting confusion in takings jurisprudence
during the period.250
In 1978, the Court, in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City,251 refused to recognize a taking despite an historic landmark preser-
vation law’s denial of millions of dollars’ worth of property improvement
rights to Grand Central Station.252 In 1982, the Court, in Loretto v. Tele-
prompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,253 found a taking involving a physical
invasion of “one-eighth of a cubic foot of space” and worthy only of
nominal damages.254
During this period, the Court, in Andrus v. Allard,255 also ruled that
owners could not sell Indian artifacts containing the feathers of protected
                                                                                                         
244. Id. at 277-78.
245. Id. at 278-79.
246. Id. at 277.
247. Id. at 279-80.
248. Id. at 279.
249. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 126, § 11.12(a) (acknowledging that the
“Court’s decisions in ‘takings’ issues may properly be viewed as a ‘crazy quilt pattern’ of rul-
ings”) (citations omitted).
250. Id.
251. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
252. Id. at 152 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 416)
(lamenting the majority’s failure to heed Justice Holmes’ warning in Pennsylvania Coal that
the courts were “‘in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the public
condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional
way of paying for the change’”).
253. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
254. Id. at 438 n.16, 443 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that the property at issue was
approximately “36 feet of cable one-half inch in diameter and two 4” x 4” x 4” metal boxes”).
255. 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
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birds and that such a prohibition did not constitute a taking.256 This deci-
sion is notable, not only for the rarity of being a Supreme Court Fifth
Amendment case concerning personal property and for the unanimous
ruling, but also for the radical holding favoring the state police power
over property owners’ rights.257
Speaking for the Court, Justice Brennan addressed the loss of eco-
nomic value attending the statutory alienation of property owners’ rights
to dispose of collectible assets by sale:
Suffice it to say that government regulation—by definition—involves
the adjustment of rights for the public good. Often this adjustment cur-
tails some potential for the use or economic exploitation of private
property. To require compensation in all such circumstances would ef-
fectively compel the government to regulate by purchase.
. . . .
The regulations challenged here do not compel the surrender of the ar-
tifacts, and there is no physical invasion or restraint upon them.
Rather, a significant restriction has been imposed on one means of dis-
posing of the artifacts. But the denial of one traditional property right
does not always amount to a taking. At least where an owner possesses
a full “bundle” of property rights, the destruction of one “strand” of
the bundle is not a taking . . . .
. . . .
It is, to be sure, undeniable that the regulations here prevent the most
profitable use of [the] property. Again, however, that is not dispositive
. . . . [A] reduction in the value of property is not necessarily equated
with a taking . . . . [L]oss of future profits—unaccompanied by any
physical property restriction—provides a slender reed upon which to
rest a takings claim.258
F.   At the Pinnacle
Takings jurisprudence achieved the pinnacle of confusion in the
Court’s 1987 decision in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedic-
tis.259 Keystone was the reincarnation of Pennsylvania Coal.260 Sixty-five
years after Justice Holmes’s decision in Pennsylvania Coal, the Court was
once again faced with a Pennsylvania statute prohibiting coal mining that
could result in subsidence damage to surface improvements.261 As before,
                                                                                                         
256. Id. at 67-68 (holding that “the simple prohibition of the sale of lawfully acquired
property . . . does not effect a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment”).
257. See id. at 65-66.
258. Id.
259. 480 U.S. 470, 504-05 (1987) (lambasting “petitioners’ position that, because they
contracted with some previous owners of property generations ago, they have a constitutionally
protected legal right to conduct their mining operations in a way that would make a shambles
of all those buildings and cemeteries”) (citation omitted).
260. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 126, § 11.12(b).
261. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 474.
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mining companies had sold real property subject to express reservations
of the rights to mine the coal providing support to the surface real es-
tate.262 Unlike the Pennsylvania Coal decision, however, the Court handed
down a five-to-four decision that no taking had occurred.263
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens declined to overrule Pennsyl-
vania Coal and asserted that the facts of Keystone were distinguishable.264
Citing Mugler, the very case that the Supreme Court declined to overturn
in Pennsylvania Coal, Justice Stevens reaffirmed the supremacy of state
police power over private property owners’ rights.265 After strong initial
support for Mugler, Justice Stevens’ opinion concluded with an apparent
determination that the statute had not gone “too far” in diminishing the
economic value of the mining companies’ property.266 In declining to
overrule Pennsylvania Coal and in permitting the judgment in Pennsylva-
nia Coal to resurface in the Keystone holding, the conflict between
Mugler and Pennsylvania Coal was allowed to fester.267
Furthermore, in light of Pennsylvania Coal, the holding in Keystone
was unjustifiable, irreconcilable, and simply erroneous. As stated by one
scholar:
[A]lthough takings doctrine has no answer to the question of whether
the [underground coal reserves] in Pennsylvania Coal or Keystone
should be deemed an independent piece of property, usings doctrine
strongly favors Justice Holmes’s decision. Underground minerals do
not have much use as a whole. And to the extent they do, Pennsylva-
nia’s anti-subsidence law in both cases effectively severed the support
coal—with respect to its potential uses—from the rest of the owner’s
property. For these reasons, under a jurisprudence of usings, the Court
in Keystone should have adhered to Pennsylvania Coal.268
G.   Public Purposes and Permit Requirements
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,269 beachfront property
owners were granted a rebuilding permit conditioned upon the owners’
                                                                                                         
262. Id. at 478.
263. Id. at 506.
264. Id. at 481-89.
265. Id. at 488-93.
266. Id. at 495-96 (noting that “petitioners have not claimed . . . that the Act makes
it commercially impracticable for them to continue mining their bituminous coal interests
in western Pennsylvania. Indeed, petitioners have not even pointed to a single mine that
can no longer be mined for profit.”). In this sentence, the author uses the phrase “too
far” as a “term of art” and not as an attribution of that phrase to Justice Stevens’ Key-
stone opinion.
267. See generally id. at 479-506.
268. Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1162 (1993).
269. 483 U.S. 825, 841-42 (1987) (ruling that “California is free to advance its
‘comprehensive program,’ if it wishes, by using its power of eminent domain for this ‘public
1996]                    GUN COLLECTORS 1135
granting an easement for lateral public access along the coastline. In yet
another five-to-four decision, the Court found that such a permit condi-
tion, known as a development exaction, was a taking when the exaction
was not reasonably necessary to effect a substantial government purpose
or the exaction failed to advance substantially a legitimate state interest.270
H.   Tricks with Mirrors
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council271 provided the Reagan/Bush-
appointed Court members with an opportunity to enunciate a conservative
standard in “takings” jurisprudence. This 1992 opinion considered the
impact of South Carolina’s Beachfront Management Act, which prohibited
the construction of permanent structures on two lots owned by Lucas.272
Despite a finding that the statute deprived Lucas of all economic value in
his property, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that the public wel-
fare interest supporting the statute trumped Lucas’s property rights and
the takings clause.273
In an opinion written by Justice Scalia, the United States Supreme
Court disagreed.274 Despite strong initial support for Pennsylvania Coal,
Justice Scalia’s opinion concluded with a finding, deferential to Mugler,
that the statute’s impact would not constitute a taking if the statute were
consistent with the background principles of the law of nuisance inherent
in Mr. Lucas’s title.275 The Court expressed doubt that the statute would
pass this test and remanded the case for a virtually certain lower court
finding that a taking had occurred.276 Nonetheless, for the second time in
five years, a case that promised to settle the conflict created by the
Mugler and Pennsylvania Coal cases failed to meet expectations.277
                                                                                                         
purpose,’ . . . but if it wants an easement across the Nollans’ property, it must pay for it”)
(citation omitted).
270. Id. at 834-67; see also Morosoff, supra note 218, at 823-24.
271. 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2901 (1992) (emphasizing “that to win its case South Carolina must
do more than proffer the legislature’s declaration that the uses Lucas desires are inconsistent
with the public interest”); see also Herman Schwartz, Property Rights and the Constitution:
Will the Ugly Duckling Become a Swan?, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 9, 10 (1987) (anticipating the in-
creasing influence of conservative economic and legal thought); Glenn P. Sugameli, Takings
Issues in Light of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Decision Full of Sound and Fury
Signifying Nothing, 12 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 439, 442-47 (1993) (presenting views on Reagan
agenda to thwart excessive property regulation at the federal and state levels).
272. 112 S. Ct. at 2889 (acknowledging that “[t]he Beachfront Management Act brought
Lucas’s plans to an abrupt end”).
273. 404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C. 1991).
274. Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2889-902.
275. Id. at 2901 (stating that “it was open to the State at any point to make the implication
of those background principles of nuisance and property law explicit”).
276. Id. at 2901-02.
277. See Sugameli, supra note 271, at 441 (predicting that Lucas will have “very little
practical effect on regulation of real property”).
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The Lucas opinion is also troublesome because of Justice Scalia’a
statement, in dicta, regarding personal property. Justice Scalia warned
personal property owners “of the possibility that new regulation might
even render [personal] property economically worthless (at least if the
property’s only economically productive use is sale or manufacture for
sale).”278 The Court apparently distinguished personal property from real
property in an attempt to remedy the conflict between Lucas’s pro-
property stance and the Andrus opinion.279 As one commentator has criti-
cized and certain courts have recognized, “This distinction is not only ar-
tificial, it is wrong. Either total destruction of private property is consti-
tutionally permissible or it is not; the Constitution draws no distinction
between the natures of the underlying property interests.”280
VII.   APPLICATION
American gun collectors, represented by Messieurs Coe and Zomber,
are justified in their concern for the future of their collections. Anti-gun
activists have established a long-term agenda aimed at the elimination of
firearms in America281 and have succeeded, thus far, in the pursuit of their
goals through legislative enactments and judicial acquiescence.282 While
gun collectors have been satisfied with the profits achieved under the
status quo,283 Messieurs Coe and Zomber might be dismayed to learn that
further movement up the anti-gun forces’ statutory ladder is legally vi-
able.
Any second-rung legislative efforts, encompassing a ban on the pro-
spective manufacture and sale of all firearms, would bear striking resem-
blance to the restrictions successfully imposed upon Indian artifact collec-
                                                                                                         
278. 112 S. Ct. at 2899.
279. Lynda J. Oswald, Cornering the Quark: Investment-Backed Expectations and Eco-
nomically Viable Uses in Takings Analysis, 70 WASH. L. REV. 91, 129-30 (1995) (“Although
the reduction in value in Andrus was substantial, the Court found that the appellees did retain
some ability to derive an economic profit from the artifacts . . . . The [artifacts] were not con-
fiscated by the government, nor were they subjected to restraint or physical invasion.”).
280. Id.; see also Warner/Elektra/Atlantic Corp. v. County of DuPage, 991 F.2d 1280, 1285
(7th Cir. 1992) (“It is rare for American governments to requisition personal property, but sometimes
they do so and when they do they have to pay just compensation.”) (citing United States v. Cors, 337
U.S. 325 (1949); see, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001-04 (1984); Fallini v.
United States, 56 F.3d 1378, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“The fact that the water at issue in this case is
personalty and the land at issue in the easement case was realty does not alter the nature of the analy-
sis.”); Pittman v. Chicago Board of Educ., 64 F.3d 1098, 1104 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing Ruckelshaus,
467 U.S. at 1003-04) (Property as used in the takings clause “encompasses real property and personal
property . . . .”).
281. See discussion supra part V.
282. See discussion supra parts III., IV. While anti-gun forces suffered a minor setback
with the failure of Brady II, future attempts at passing similar legislation will undoubtedly be
made. See supra notes 188, 193 and accompanying text.
283. See discussion supra part V.
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tors by the Eagle Protection Act addressed in Andrus.284 The congruence
between any second-rung efforts to eliminate previously legal economic
transactions and Mugler’s conversion of a legal enterprise into a nuisance
is unmistakable.285 There would be a similarity between the second rung’s
motivation to reduce crime and protect lives and Keystone’s affirmation of
the supremacy of state police power over private property owners’
rights.286 Nollan’s requirements—that regulations be reasonably necessary
to effect a substantial government purpose or substantially advance a le-
gitimate state interest—could easily be drafted into third-rung legisla-
tion.287 Furthermore, third-rung legislation would find support in Lucas’s
personal property denigration.288 Accordingly, legislative and judicial
precedent exists for the noncompensable confiscation of all but the pos-
sessory value of American firearms collections.289 First-rung legislation
would embrace the outright confiscation of firearms.290 While such legis-
lation would confront the Fifth Amendment, gun collectors could not be
assured of the recovery of their investments, since no Supreme Court de-
cision addresses a similar issue.291
Anti-gun activists would undoubtedly argue that Mugler292 and
Schoene293 support the proposition that the confiscation of an entire class
of property recognized by the government as noxious to the public interest
does not impose a duty to compensate.294 However, such precedent does
not indicate that the Court has gone, or is prepared to go, that far.
Mugler, which addressed the loss of economic value resulting from a
previously legitimate activity’s being reclassified as a noxious use, is dis-
tinguishable from the first rung’s confiscation of firearms.295 Mugler’s
brewery was not physically taken.296 Neither were the apple trees in
Schoene.297 While both Mugler and Schoene legitimize governmental con-
version of historically significant business activities from legal to noxious,
neither case resulted in the property’s being physically taken from the
owners.298 On the other hand, Pennsylvania Coal stands for the proposi-
                                                                                                         
284. See discussion supra part VI.E.
285. See discussion supra part VI.B.
286. See discussion supra part VI.F.
287. See discussion supra part VI.G.
288. See discussion supra part VI.H.
289. See discussion supra part VI.
290. See discussion supra part V.
291. See discussion supra part VI.
292. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
293. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
294. See O’Hare & Pedreira, supra note 19, at 200-01 (citing Mugler and Schoene to sup-
port the proposition that “a state has no duty to compensate a property owner if an entire class
of property is destroyed for the public good rather than taken for public use”).
295. See discussion supra part VI.
296. See discussion supra part VI.
297. See discussion supra part VI.D.
298. See discussion supra part VI.
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tion that there are implied limitations of the police power.299 Should first-
rung legislation be enacted and survive Second and Ninth Amendment
challenges, the Court could well find either a noncompensable noxious
use or a police power application that has gone too far in favor of the
public interest.300 If the Court takes the latter position, then the “absolute
conversion” principle exposed by the Court in Pumpelly would dictate
compensation to the aggrieved gun collector.301
Should the Supreme Court hold that first-rung legislation requires
compensation, gun collectors may be tempted to conclude that their hob-
bies would be preserved due to the massive economic ramifications at-
tending such a holding. However, gun collectors must refrain from
reaching this conclusion because the financial consequences of a legal
confiscation would not be sufficiently severe. The Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms estimates that there is a circulation of 222 million
firearms within an American population of 260 million.302 Conservatively
appraised at an average of $300 per firearm of net salvage value, the total
fair market value attributable to the firearms in circulation is estimated to
be $66.6 billion.303 However, when compared to current federal spending
of $1.5 trillion per annum,304 the fair market value of American firearms
represents less than five percent of the federal budget. Considering that
this also represents between one-fifth and one-third of the projected sav-
ings and loan bailout cost,305 Messieurs Coe and Zomber should be con-
cerned about the future of their hobbies.
Equally troublesome to gun collectors is a type of anti-gun statute
herein defined as a “practical confiscation.” Practical confiscation laws
do not require a gun owner to surrender offending firearms to the gov-
ernment. Rather, surrender of the firearms is one of a limited number of
statutory options available to enable compliance with gun-restrictive legis-
                                                                                                         
299. See discussion supra part VI.C.; see also supra notes 239-42 and accompanying text.
300. See O’Hare & Pedreira, supra note 19, at 200-01 (arguing that the Court should find
a noncompensable taking in the case of fourth-rung legislation). But cf. Mark Udulutch, Note,
The Constitutional Implications of Gun Control and Several Realistic Gun Control Proposals,
17 AM. J. CRIM. L. 19, 39-41 (1989) (concluding that a federal government-imposed firearms
ban would require compensation).
301. See discussion supra part VI.A.
302. Robert Davis & Haya El Nasser, New Ammo for Gun Debate, USA TODAY, Dec. 28,
1994, at A1.
303. Telephone Interview with Wain Roberts, supra note 8 (stating that $300 would be a
reasonable valuation for the average American firearm in circulation). To place this figure in
perspective, the fair market values of the two largest mergers in American history were $25
billion for the RJR-Nabisco combination and $19 billion for the Walt Disney-Capital Cit-
ies/ABC transaction. Paul Farhi, Walt Disney Co. To Buy Capital Cities/ABC; $19 Billion
Merger Would Create a Giant in Movies, Television, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 1995, at A1.
304. 142 CONG. REC. S4161 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1996) (statement of Sen. Moseley-Braun).
305. Amy Waldman, Move Over, Charles Keating. Causes of the Savings and Loan Scan-
dal, 27 WASH. MONTHLY 26 (1995) (estimating the cost of the savings and loan bailout at a
minimum of $110 billion).
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lation.306 Other options typically allow owners voluntarily to sell their
firearms or retain ownership in another jurisdiction.307 For example, in
Fesjian v. Jefferson,308 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals denied a
Fifth Amendment challenge to a practical confiscation statute that re-
quired the owner of a firearm not satisfying the statute’s registration cri-
teria to “(1) ‘peaceably surrender’ the firearm to the chief of police, (2)
‘lawfully remove’ the firearm from the District for as long as he retains
an interest in the firearm, or (3) ‘lawfully dispose’ of his interest in the
firearm.”309 Taking Fesjian to the logical extreme, Congress could enact
practical confiscation legislation requiring Americans to surrender fire-
arms without compensation so long as citizens are allowed to sell or
physically transfer their firearms overseas. Denying personal satisfaction
to those financially or otherwise unable to travel overseas, such options
would effectively disarm the American gun collector.
VIII.   STRICT CONSTRUCTION AND PLAIN MEANING
The Second Amendment has been the subject of much debate.310 Legis-
latures, the judiciary, and academics have argued whether the right to
bear arms is limited by a duty of service in the militia.311 Anti-gun forces
have been quick to apply a modern definition of the word “militia” to
limit the right to bear arms to those persons in active military service.312
While they have propounded the militia/right to arms nexus in both Con-
gress and the courts,313 their arguments are ignorant and defective given
the historical perspective.314
                                                                                                         
306. See, e.g., D.C. CODE 1981, § 6-2320(c) (1995).
307. See, e.g., id.
308. 399 A.2d 861 (D.C. 1979).
309. Id. at 865 (citing D.C. CODE § 6-1820(c) (Supp. 1978)); see also Quilici v. Village of
Morton Grove, 532 F. Supp. 1169, 1183-84 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (declining to find a taking when
“gun owners who wish to may sell or otherwise dispose of their handguns outside” the town’s
lawful boundaries), aff’d, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
310. See, e.g., Vandercoy, supra note 19; Levinson, supra note 43; Herz, supra note 55;
Aborn, supra note 143.
311. Van Alstyne discounts the argument that the right to bear arms is limited by a duty of
service in the militia:
In recent years it has been suggested that the Second Amendment protects the
“collective” right of states to maintain militias, while it does not protect the right
of “the people” to keep and bear arms. If anyone entertained this notion in the
period during which the Constitution and Bill of Rights were debated and ratified,
it remains one of the most closely guarded secrets of the eighteenth century, for
no known writing surviving from the period between 1787 and 1791 states such a
thesis.
William Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the Personal Right to Arms, 43 DUKE L.J.
1236, 1243 n.19 (1994) (quoting STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE
EVOLUTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 83 (1984)); see also discussion supra part III.B.
312. See Herz, supra note 55, at 64.
313. See discussion supra parts III., IV.
314. See discussion supra part II.
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Despite an explicit guarantee of rights retained by the American peo-
ple, the Ninth Amendment has been ignored by Congress, the judiciary,
and academics. John E. Nowak and Ronald D. Rotunda, in their compre-
hensive constitutional law “hornbook,” devoted only a footnote to the
subject.315 Despite the summary treatment they accord, the immense sig-
nificance of the Ninth Amendment to the right to bear arms radiates from
this literary atom.316
Although the Ninth Amendment has not been used as the basis for de-
fining rights of individuals and invalidating either federal or state laws,
it has been mentioned as a possible basis for justifying judicial protec-
tion of rights not explicitly listed in the Constitution or other Amend-
ments. References to the Amendment in the Supreme Court appear to
be only in dicta or in opinions of individual Justices.317
Takings jurisprudence is a massive body of conflicting law.318 There is
sufficient precedent to allow virtually any case to be decided as a taking
or vice versa.319
As explained above, the American gun collector is precariously pro-
tected under the concepts and applications of modern constitutional law.
The Second Amendment’s purpose is perverted by wordsmithing. The
Fifth Amendment is convoluted by conflicting judicial rulings. The Ninth
Amendment is ignored as inconsequential. When a statute generates con-
flicting court decisions due to ambiguity, change in circumstances, or
misinterpretation, the responsible legislative body often reconvenes to
clarify the intent and redraft the statute. However, given the protracted
constitutional amendment process, a redrafting of the Second, Fifth, and
Ninth Amendments is unlikely. Thankfully, constitutional redrafting is not
only improbable but also unnecessary.
Strict construction of the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments is a
workable and practical alternative to constitutional redrafting. Moreover,
strict construction of the Constitution is a stated requirement. According
to Chief Justice John Marshall, “The words of the [C]onstitution, then,
are express, and incapable of being misunderstood. They admit of no va-
riety of construction . . . .”320
                                                                                                         
315. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 126, § 11.7, at n.10.
316. See Discussion supra part II.C.
317. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 126, § 11.7, at n.10 (citing Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 579-80 n.15 (1980) (plurality opinion by Burger, C.J.)
(justifying a judicial role in defining “fundamental rights not expressly guaranteed” and stat-
ing: “Madison’s efforts, culminating in the Ninth Amendment, served to allay the fears of
these who were concerned that expressing certain guarantees could be read as excluding oth-
ers.").
318. See discussion supra parts VI., VII.
319. See discussion supra parts VI., VII.
320. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 198 (1819) (holding that the State
of New York could not release a debtor from his contractual obligations).
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The plain meaning of the Second Amendment, when taken in historical
context, is undeniable. The term “militia” describes the American male
populace.321 In 1791, when the Bill of Rights was ratified, the availability
of arms to the general able male population for service in the militia was
viewed as necessary to preserve a free state.322 Consequently, “the right of
the people to keep and bear [a]rms[] shall not be infringed.”323
The Ninth Amendment declares that “[t]he enumeration in the Consti-
tution, of certain rights,” may not serve to eliminate other rights enjoyed
by the American populace.324 Since American citizens clearly enjoyed the
right to keep and bear arms in 1791, the right to bear arms, from an his-
torical perspective, is not only fundamental but absolute.325 Thus, regard-
less of the Second Amendment’s reference to the “militia,” the Constitu-
tion reflects American history and guarantees the right to arms through
the Ninth Amendment.
Similarly, the Fifth Amendment’s requirement that “private property
[not] be taken for public use, without just compensation” is readily appar-
ent.326 “[P]rivate property” refers to property that is owned by individuals
and nongovernmental entities.327 “[T]aken for public use” means the re-
moval of any property right from the control of the private property
owner for the benefit of the general public.328 “[W]ithout just compensa-
tion” indicates that adequate value attributed to any rights lost by private
property owners should be paid by the applicable government body repre-
senting the general public in the case at hand.329
What gun collectors require of the American legal system is sufficient
judicial courage for the Court to found the law upon the simple definitions
discussed above. Those who would prefer other alternatives would be
wise to consider the following words of Justice Sutherland:
                                                                                                         
321. See Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886); see also discussion supra part II.
322. U.S. CONST. amend. II; see also discussion supra part II.
323. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
324. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
325. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
326. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
327. BLACK’S, supra note 209, at 1195 (defining “[p]rivate as [a]ffecting or belonging to
private individuals, as distinct from the public generally”); id. at 1217 (defining “[p]rivate
property” thus: “[a]s protected from being taken for public uses, is such property as belongs
absolutely to an individual, and of which he has the exclusive right of disposition”); cf. id.
(defining “[p]ublic property” as “those things . . . considered as being owned by ‘the public,’
the entire state or community, and not restricted to the dominion of a private person”); see
generally Jeremy Paul, Can Rights Move Left?, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1622 (1990) (reviewing
JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY (1988)) (offering a discussion of the
American private property system and private property rights).
328. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979).
329. BLACK’S, supra note 209, at 1195 (defining “[j]ust compensation” as “compensation
which is fair to both the owner and the public”); see also Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 176
(requiring governmental payment for the taking of a “stick [] in the bundle of rights that are
commonly characterized as property ”).
1142 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:1101
If the Constitution, intelligently and reasonably construed in the light of
these principles, stands in the way of desirable legislation, the blame
must rest upon that instrument, and not upon the court for enforcing it
according to its terms. The remedy in that situation—and the only true
remedy—is to amend the Constitution. Judge Cooley, in the first vol-
ume of his Constitutional Limitations . . . very clearly pointed out that
much of the benefit expected from written Constitutions would be lost
if their provisions were to be bent to circumstances or modified by
public opinion. He pointed out that the common law, unlike a Consti-
tution, was subject to modification by public sentiment and action
which the courts might recognize; but that “a court or legislature which
should allow a change in public sentiment to influence it in giving to a
written constitution a construction not warranted by the intention of its
founders, would be justly chargeable with reckless disregard of official
oath and public duty; and if its course could become a precedent, these
instruments would be of little avail.”330
Perhaps Justice Frankfurter most succinctly summarized the subject of
constitutional interpretation when he quoted Chief Justice John Marshall:
“Precisely because ‘it is a constitution we are expounding,’ . . . we ought
not to take liberties with it.”331
IX.   CONCLUSION
Despite the hope that Congress would act to protect individual rights
and liberties, the Framers of the Constitution intended Congress to func-
tion in a legislative capacity responsive to popular majority views in ac-
cordance with the concept of a democratic form of government.332 The
Framers realized that popular sentiment might operate to limit or elimi-
nate individual freedoms to benefit the majority at the expense of the mi-
nority. Consequently, the Framers understood that American fundamental
liberties embodied in the Bill of Rights had to be protected for the benefit
of all Americans regardless of the majority view.333 To this end, the
                                                                                                         
330. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 404 (1937) (Sutherland, Van Devan-
ter, McReynolds & Butler, JJ., dissenting).
331. National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 647 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting and quoting Marshall, C.J.).
332. U.S. CONST. art. I.
333. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpre-
tation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1210 (1987) (Interpretivism’s intellectual attractiveness de-
rives from two closely related sources. The first is the assumption that the Constitution creates
a predominantly democratic and majoritarian structure of government. With democracy repre-
senting the norm, interpretivists argue that society has consented to be bound by decisions of
the Supreme Court, a nondemocratic institution, “only ‘within defined areas by certain endur-
ing principles believed to be stated in, and placed beyond the reach of majorities by, the Con-
stitution.’”) (quoting Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
L.J. 1, 3 (1971)).
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Framers empowered the Supreme Court with the ability to adjudicate the
constitutionality of legislative enactments.334
At present, the popular majority undoubtedly favors increased firearm
restrictions.335 Given our democratic form of government, Congress can-
not be blamed for responding favorably to popular demands by enacting
anti-gun legislation. Such congressional actions, while offensive to the
Bill of Rights, are in keeping with Congress’s constitutional role. On the
other hand, the Framers relied upon the United States Supreme Court to
resist political temptation and to look beyond the popular will to protect
the Constitution.336 To succeed in this historic role, the Court must defend
the Bill of Rights in the face of popular sentiment. The Court must not
falter lest the American populace be faced with the continued erosion of
fundamental liberties and the conversion of “‘[g]overnment of the people,
by the people, and for the people’ into a government over the people.”337
“The [C]onstitution requires more than that.”338
                                                                                                         
334. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra
note 126, § 1.3.
335. See Aborn, supra note 143, at 431 (citing a CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll of Dec. 17,
1993 and a LH Research, Inc. poll of Apr. 1, 1993); see also Andrew J. McClurg, The
Rhetoric of Gun Control, 42 AM. U.L. REV. 53, 54 (1992) (“Despite all the rhetoric from the
gun lobby, the fact is that the vast majority of law enforcement officials and most of the
American public supports [the Brady] bill.”) (citation omitted).
336. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (A. Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (calling
on the judiciary to defend the Constitution against the “encroachments and oppressions of the
representative body”).
337. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 68 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
338. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 854 P.2d 437, 447 (Or. 1993) (Peterson, J., dissenting),
rev’d, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
